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0.  Abstract 
 
This project seeks, through a comprehensive literature research, to identify the 
elements that allow to define and to assess the Security of the Containerized Supply 
Chain. The main points developed in the project are: 
• Introduction: The Security of the Containerized Supply Chain (C.S.C.) 
• Literature review of Elements related with the Security and the Performance of 
the C.S.C. 
• Proposed and Implemented measures to improve the Security of the C.S.C. 
• Analysis of the measures to improve the Security of the C.S.C. 
• Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In the Introduction will be discussed the concept of containerized supply chain, 
which is its definition, the reasons for its existence, its extent and importance in today's 
society, what factors have led to the increasing importance of the C.S.C. in the 
international transport system, among other aspects. All this information is intended to 
help discern why the C.S.C. is an essential element in the global economy and why we 
should analyze and try to improve its security. 
 
Additionally, will be outlined how has been addressed the topic of the Security of the 
C.S.C. to date by the different actors involved, making a clear distinction in the way of 
acting before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 
Certainly, the way that it is treated the issue of the Security of the C.S.C. in the 
literature has changed radically from a literature that gave emphasis on managing the 
security to prevent the “smuggling and shrinkage (the loss of cargo shipments through 
theft and misrouting)” to a literature that emphasizes in “preventing terrorists from 
targeting the C.S.C. or transporting a weapon in a shipping container”. 
 
 
The Literature Review will begin with an extensive search of literature related to the 
Security of the C.S.C. and its evaluation. 
 
Then will be analyzed the literature identified, trying to collect those items that are 
considered useful to define and assess the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
In the process of analysis of the literature, have been directly identified 30 elements 
that allow to define and to assess the Security of the C.S.C. at different levels and from 
different points of view. 
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The next step will be to analyze the collected items of literature, linking them 
conceptually. From this linking will be intended generate a series of basic elements that 
broadly define all aspects affecting the security and performance of the C.S.C. 
 
Therefore, from the analysis of the definitions given by the authors for each of 
these elements, it can be observed that although with sometimes quite different 
denominations and with definitions a little different, many of the elements proposed 
by the authors have big and obvious points in common. 
Thus, conceptually linking the identified elements, they have been grouped into 14 
basic concepts that have been referred as Global Elements in this project and that 
define the security and performance of the C.S.C. 
 
From that moment, it will work with these "basic elements” generated, classifying 
conceptually and using them to analyze the measures proposed to improve the Security 
of the C.S.C. 
 
Thus, going deeper into the definition of the elements integrated into each of the 
global elements, it has been generated a conceptual definition for each Global 
Element. 
From the process of generation of conceptual definition of the Global Elements, can 
be concluded that exists a clear difference of nature between those Global Elements. 
So, can be identified 3 major subgroups in which can be classified the 14 Global 
Elements: 
• In this way, have been identified a group of Global Elements relating to all 
those basic elements, tools and procedures that define the Security of the 
C.S.C. This group of Global Elements, in this project, has been named as Tools. 
• Another group of Global elements relating to the possible problems that may 
affect in a negative way in the operation of the C.S.C. This group of Global 
Elements has been named as Vulnerabilities. 
• And finally, another group of Global Elements relating to all elements that 
define the performance of the C.S.C. This group of elements has been named 
as Performance. 
 
 
In the Proposed and Implemented Measures will have a broad collection of 
agreement and technological measures, implemented or under development to 
improve the security of the C.S.C. 
 
Thus, through the analysis of the specialized literature have been identified a large 
number of proposals to improve the security of the C.S.C. Moreover, have been 
detected two distinct levels in terms of these measures. So, there are those that have 
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been referred to as Agreement Measures and those that have been referred to as 
Technological Measures. 
 
Within the Agreement Measures are included all efforts made regarding the 
creation of national and international agreements, policies, performance standards, 
rules and programs. 
Thus, the Agreement Measures identified in the literature and analyzed are the 
following: 
• Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) 
• Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
• Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
• Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) 
• Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
• Megaports Initiative 
• International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) 
 
Within the Technological Measures are included all those technologies used or in 
developing to improve and strengthen the security of the C.S.C. in the various levels of 
the supply chain and in different focal areas. 
Thus, the Technological Measures identified in the literature and analyzed are the 
following: 
• Antitamper Seals Technologies 
• Sensor Technologies 
• Radio-Frequency Identification Technologies 
• Non-Intrusive Inspections Technologies 
• WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies 
• Automated Targeting Technologies 
• Authentication Technologies 
 
 
In the section Analysis of the Measures will be analyzed the agreement and 
technological measures collected regarding the "global elements" generated in the 
Literature Review section. 
 
To do this, in a first phase has been analyzed for each measure identified, which 
basic elements of the Security of the C.S.C. are affected. These basic elements have 
been identified in this project and have been denominated as the global elements 
“Tools”. 
In a second phase, it has been analyzed for each measure identified how it affects at 
the different elements of the Performance of the C.S.C. These elements have been 
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identified in this project and have been denominated as the global elements 
“Performance”. 
 
 
Finally, the study will be completed extracting the considered most relevant 
Conclusions emerged in the development of this project.  
 
So, are exposed the most relevant conclusions that can be extracted from the different 
basic phases of this project: 
• In the process of searching for the literature used as a basis of study and 
analysis in this project. 
• In the process of the analysis of the documents, collecting and linking the 
identified elements that allow to define and to assess the Security of the C.S.C.  
• In the process of collection and analysis of the proposed and implemented 
Measures to improve the security of the C.S.C. 
 
And additionally, in this section of the project will be intended to propose a set of 
Recommendations of action addressed to specialized authors and to the stakeholders 
directly involved in the topic of the Security of the C.S.C. 
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1. Introduction: The Security of the Containerized Supply Chain (C.S.C.) 
 
In this section will be discussed the concept of containerized supply chain, which is 
its definition, the reasons for its existence, its extent and importance in today's society, 
what factors have led to the increasing importance of the C.S.C. in the international 
transport system, among other aspects. All this information is intended to help discern 
why the C.S.C. is an essential element in the global economy and why we should 
analyze and try to improve its security. 
 
Additionally, will be outlined how has been addressed the topic of the Security of 
the C.S.C. to date by the different actors involved, making a clear distinction in the way 
of acting before and after the attacks of 11 September 2001. 
 
 
1.1. The Containerized Supply Chain 
 
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, has been increased exponentially the literature 
related to the C.S.C., its size and its strategic importance in the economies of the 
different nations in the World. 
 
Unfortunately, most literature is focused to the specific case of the United States. That 
is, how the U.S. faced the issue of the C.S.C. and its security. 
 
Following, will be explained which is the C.S.C., through the definitions that have 
developed the literature analyzed in this project about this topic. 
 
 
A global supply chain links all the economies in the world. The unit of measure of the 
supply chain is the shipping container: a sturdy steel box of standard dimensions that 
carries most freight. Millions of containers circle the earth on specialized ships, railcars, 
and trucks.  
 
The global supply chain is an international system that has evolved to make the 
transport of freight throughout the world amazingly efficient. The chain consists of the 
suppliers, manufacturing centers, warehouses, distribution centers, and retail outlets 
that move raw materials, work-in-progress inventory, and finished products from 
producer to consumer. The shipping container and its transport system are integral 
components of the global supply chain [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
 
 
In today’s global community, there is no single system that governs the international 
movement of containerized freight. Instead, multiple actors, agencies, industries, 
agreements, and legal frameworks affect containerized supply chain systems [Grillot-
Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 (B5)]. 
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Approximately 90 percent of the world’s cargo is shipped via container, including 75 
percent (by value) of non-North American trade to and from the United States. There 
are approximately 18 million containers of various sizes around the world.  
These containers are bolted to the chassis of trucks, stacked two high on flatbed 
railcars, and packed onto ships as large as aircraft carriers carrying thousands of such 
containers. Port operations and technology are optimized so that ships spend a 
minimum amount of time at the quay and the maximum time en route [Willis-Ortiz, 
2004 (B6)]. 
 
So, containerized transportation has become an increasingly global network that 
enables goods and people to move quickly and easily among nations around the world.  
 
This phenomenon is the result of the growing economic, social, and cultural 
interconnectedness that is known as globalization. Closely related is another 
development— the growing emphasis on intermodalism—which also forces us to think 
about transportation in a new way. Transportation today no longer consists of several 
disparate modes functioning as separate entities; on the contrary, the various 
modes—air, land, sea—are working together ever more closely so that an integrated 
system is spreading across the world for both passenger and freight, though the latter 
is far more advanced [Joseph S. Szyliowicz, 2003 (B8)]. 
 
Supply chain operations represent an enormous asymmetric threat to the US with in 
excess of 200 million cargo containers moving around the world each year; 12 million 
containers entering US ports annually, of which only 3-5% can be physically inspected 
under current arrangements [Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 (B7)].  
 
Thus, it is clear that the Security of the C.S.C. is a problem of great importance that 
must be analyzed. 
 
 
1.2. The Security of the Containerized Supply Chain 
 
The way to see the Security of the C.S.C. by the different stakeholders involved in and 
managing it, changed dramatically after of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 
Thus since then, it has emerged vast amount of literature discussing the changes 
arising from September 11, remarking before and after, commenting on and criticizing 
the measures carried out and, proposing different ways of acting and key elements in 
the security of the C.S.C. 
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1.2.1. Situation before September 11, 2001 
 
Actions to ensure the security of the system of containers and their conveyances have 
traditionally focused on preventing smuggling and shrinkage (the loss of cargo 
shipments through theft and misrouting).  
 
The principal concern of business was to increase the efficiency of the global supply 
chain, paying comparatively little attention to security. In recent years, ocean carriers 
have cut crews to an absolute minimum and have continued to order larger and faster 
ships in an effort to squeeze every cent of profit from the system [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
(B6)]. 
 
Transportation security essentially meant aviation security before 9/11. This was the 
only mode that received any significant attention, and even that was sporadic and 
directed to the prevention of a specific kind of attack that had been carried out 
successfully. The security needs of the other modes (road, rail, and sea) were largely 
ignored, even though experts warned that security in those modes also needed 
attention [Joseph S. Szyliowicz, 2003 (B8)].  
 
Thus, despite numerous warnings, reports, and studies, the transportation security 
system that existed before September 11, had serious and quite obvious deficiencies. 
 
In his article Joseph S. Szyliowicz, 2003 (B8), identifies the following deficiencies of the 
transportation security system, before 9/11: 
 
1. The lack of intergovernmental coordination, especially in regard to intelligence, 
perhaps the most critical area for the prevention of terrorist attacks.  
2. The relationship between state action and the private sector, especially given 
the latter’s tendency to minimize expenditures on security and the need to 
answer the key public policy question of how much security at what price is 
required. 
3. The only unit concerned with coordinating security across modes possessed 
inadequate powers and resources and was vulnerable to the actions of 
congressional budget cutters. 
4. The focus remained on technology and law enforcement with little attention to 
the context of terrorism or the social causes or to coordinating policy with 
security issues. 
 
 
1.2.2. Situation after September 11, 2001 
 
Since September 11, 2001, supply-chain security has been redefined as preventing 
terrorists from targeting the C.S.C. or transporting a weapon in a shipping container. 
The change in focus raises questions about the effectiveness of proposed security 
efforts and the consequences that they may have for supply-chain efficiency. 
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The initial reaction of national and global supply chains to the September 11 attacks 
was to increase stock levels to mitigate the possibility of further and sustained supply 
interruptions. This rapidly developed into additional initiatives and measures to secure 
the supply chain, constrained by the sheer size and scope of global operations faced by 
many multinational companies [Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 (B7)]. 
 
Containers potentially pose a serious threat to the Nations security. They can be used 
to transport illegal weapons, chemicals, explosive materials, and even people. More 
likely, they can serve as receptacles for dirty bombs or other explosives that could be 
detonated at seaports. The threat to life is significant, but even greater is the potential 
economic threat were a container to be used as a bomb at a major port, thus closing 
operations [Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 (B5)]. 
 
Anonymity of contents, opaque ownership arrangements for vessels, and corruption in 
foreign ports have all facilitated the efforts of those who are inclined to use container 
shipping for illegal purposes [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
 
The tragedy of September 11 spurred a wide range of policy responses designed to 
minimize what remains a very serious threat to the nation’s security. 
 
Since 9/11, US policy regarding the Security of the C.S.C. has been the protection of 
American ports (especially seaports) employing “a layered defense”, which requires a 
multitude of policies, programs, and actors be involved. The theory is that, if there is a 
breach in one layer, it will be caught in subsequent layers.  
In addition to a layered defense, there has been a conscious effort to “push the 
borders out”. This means thinking not just in terms of US borders, where a threat has 
the greatest potential for harm, but enhancing security around the world to create a 
buffer [Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 (B5)]. 
 
All agencies therefore, should work together to ensure that at all levels (local, national 
and international) policies and procedures are coordinated. This requires a great deal 
of communication, cooperation, and information-sharing to be effective 
 
Because the C.S.C. is the central component of global trade, it has been necessary to 
incorporate public and private actors in both a domestic and international setting into 
the national strategy of each country [Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 (B5)]. 
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2. Literature review to identify Elements related with the Security and 
Performance of the C.S.C. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This section is the main and largest block of this project. Is where the greatest effort 
has been made regarding search and analysis of the literature on the topic of the C.S.C. 
and its Security, with the main objective of identify Elements related with the Security 
and Performance of the C.S.C. that allow to define and assess this Security. 
 
Following, it will be exposed the whole process followed in this Literature Review to 
obtain the previously mentioned Elements. 
 
The first step has been to generate a rich Research Database for the project. To do this 
has been carried out an exhaustive search of documents related to the Security of the 
C.S.C. and its evaluation. 
 
Once created this database specifically for the Project, we have been able to begin the 
analysis of the documents that compose this Research Database. 
 
Through this comprehensive analysis, have been identified these Elements related 
with the Security and Performance of the C.S.C. that allow to define and assess this 
Security. 
 
The next step has been to link conceptually the identified elements, generating what 
has been called in this project as Global Elements. 
 
Since then, it have worked with these Global Elements, analyzing what Global 
Elements are more used by the authors in the literature, developing an integrative 
conceptual definition of each Global Element and identifying possible classifications of 
these Global Elements. 
 
These Global Elements identified have been used in subsequent sections of this project 
(points 3 and 4 of the project) to identify and analyze the proposed and implemented 
Measures to improve the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
Below, it is proceeded to explain in more detail the process followed in this section of 
the project. 
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2.2. Research Database 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this section, the first step has been to generate a 
rich Research Database for the Project. For this, has been performed an exhaustive 
search of documents related to the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
In the ANNEX 1: Research Database (excel) there is the Excel file where have been 
collected and coded the documents found, studied and analyzed. 
 
To do the search of the documents have been used as the main source of search the 
databases ISI Web of Knowledge and SCOPUS. And to make the search in the 
databases ISI Web of Knowledge and SCOPUS, have been used a set of Research 
Topics, which are listed in next subsections. 
 
In the Excel, have been identified each document with an alphanumeric code: 
Letter+Number. 
 
For each document have been also indicated the Research Topics used to find them in 
the database "ISI Web of Knowledge" 
• For example, the following code: 01 (8) indicates that have been found the 
document using the Research topic RS-01 in the ISI database and the 
document is in position 8 of the results list. 
• The documents that are coded as follows: 05 (8.1) are documents that have 
not found directly in ISI but have been found elsewhere through a document 
from the ISI database. 
 
In the Excel file, below the main table, are listed the documents that are considered 
interesting but couldn't be found the full document. 
 
For each document that has been available, have been also mentioned the website 
where have been found the full document. 
 
 
Once created this database specifically for the Project, it has been able to begin the 
analysis of the documents that compose this Research Database. 
 
Through this comprehensive analysis, have been identified these Elements related 
with the Security and Performance of the C.S.C. that allow to define and assess this 
Security. 
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Similarly, for each file analyzed, has been identified that all secondary information that 
is also relevant to this project, such as the “Proposed and implemented Measures to 
improve the Security of the C.S.C.” 
 
According to the potential information that can be extracted from each of the 
documents, they have been rated with a level of utility. 
 
In this form, in addition has been updated periodically the Excel ANNEX 1: Research 
Database where have been collected all the documents found, marking progressively 
the elements already read and analyzed. 
 
 
2.2.1.  Documents of the Research Database 
 
Below, there is the list of documents found during  the search, that forms the Research 
Database and that have been the basis of study and analysis of this project. 
 
Are marked in green, the documents that have been considered important in the 
development of the study of the documents and in the development of this project. 
 
Are marked in orange, the documents that are considered essentials in the 
development of the study of the documents and in the development of this project. 
 
 
Id Document Name 
A0 Methods Toward Supply Chain Risk Analysis 
A1 Risk Assessment of Supply Chain System Based on Information Entropy 
A2 The contribution of third-party indices in assessing global operational risks 
A3 An empirical investigation into supply chain vulnerability 
A4 Assessing the vulnerability of supply chains using graph theory 
A5 The roles of risk and efficiency on the relation between logistics performance and customer 
A6 
Semi-quantitative risk assessment of commercial scale supply chain of hydrogen fuel and 
implications 
A7 Risk assessment and management for supply chain networks A case study 
A8 Safety assessment of envisaged systems for automotive hydrogen supply and utilization 
A9 The design of robust value-creating supply chain networks.  A critical review 
B0 Buyer perceptions of supply disruption risk A behavioral view and empirical assessment 
B1 The Research of Container Multimodal Transport Risk Assessment Based on BP Neural Network 
B2 A Supply Chain Risk Assessment Model Based on Multistage Influence Diagram 
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B3 A Searching Model of Trustworthy Supply Chain --TSFM 
B4 Risk Analysis of Chemical, Biological, or Radionuclear Threats Implications for Food Security 
B5 National and Global Efforts to Enhance Containerized Freight Security 
B6 Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain 
B7 A Fully Integrated Global Strategic Supply Network 
B8 International Transportation Security 
B9 Container security a proposal for a comprehensive code of conduct 
C0 The political economy of maritime container security 
C1 Spring 2008. Industry Study. Transportation 
C2 Maritime Commerce Security Plan for The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
C3 Introduction Terrorism and Transportation Security 
C4 Container Security Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe 
C5 Applying risk assessment to secure the containerized supply chain 
C6 The Container Security Initiative and Ocean Container Threats 
C7 Design and integration of the containers inspection activities in the container terminal operations 
C8 Simulation, risks modeling and sensors technologies for container terminals security 
C9 Protecting the Nation's Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost 
D0 Transportation security technologies research and development 
D1 RFID-enabled Innovative Solutions Promote Container Security 
D2 Critical factors affecting the adoption of container security service: The shippers’ perspective 
D3 Security Supply Chain 
D4 Higher supply chain security with lower cost Lessons from total quality management 
D5 An approach to security and privacy of RFID system for supply chain 
D6 Supply Chain Management under the Threat of International Terrorism 
Table 1. Documents of the Research Database 
 
Thus, to make the study that composes this project, the analysis has done with a total 
of 37 documents. 
 
In the ANNEX 4: Documents of the Research Database there are the full pdf’s files of 
the documents that compose the Research Database. 
 
 
2.2.2.  Research Topics 
 
The Research Topics inserted in the database ISI Web of Knowledge and SCOPUS to 
find the necessary documents for this project are the following: 
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Id Name Document 
RS-00 methods assess security supply chain 
RS-01 risk assessment supply chain 
RS-02 supply chain security assessment 
RS-03 containerized supply chain 
RS-04 assess supply chain security 
RS-05 container supply chain security 
Table 2. Research Topics 
 
 
2.3. Collecting the Elements 
 
Thoroughly analyzing each of the documents of the Research Database, it has been 
tried to identify those Elements related with the Security and Performance of the C.S.C. 
that allow to define and assess this Security and performance. 
 
In the ANNEX 2: Elements (Colleting-Linking-Classification) there is the Excel file that 
has been used to made the collection and the linking of the elements identified in 
some of the documents that compose the Research database. 
 
 
2.3.1. Elements for Author 
 
So, the first step has been to identify the relevant elements in the different 
documents. 
 
By the studying of the documents, have been identified those that provided relevantly 
Elements related with the Security and Performance of the C.S.C. 
 
In the following table are collected the elements identified in the analysis of the 
documents, for each of the authors that address this issue in a relevant way. 
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Table 3. Groups of elements by Author 
 
 
2.3.2. Collection of original Elements 
 
The next step has been collect and put in common all the elements to facilitate the 
identification of conceptual relationships between the 30 elements resulting from the 
study of the documents. 
 
In the following table are exposed the groups of original elements by author identified 
in the documents from the Research Database, put in common to link them 
conceptually in later sections. 
 
 
Infrastructure B5 
Policy 
Documentation 
Cooperation and Coordination 
Efficiency B6 
Shipment reliability 
Shipment transparency 
Fault tolerance 
Resilience 
Physical logistics layer B6 
Transaction layer 
Oversight layer 
Contamination A0 
Disruption 
Corruption 
Robustness A9 
Flexibility 
Redundancy 
Id B5 B6 A0 A9 B7 C2
Autor Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman Willis-Ortiz Pai-Kallepalli-Caudill-Zhou Klibi-Martel-Guitouni
Hauser-Graham-Koerner-
Davis
Dep. of Homeland
Security
Year 2009 2004 2003 2009 2004 2005
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
Inf rastructure Ef f iciency Contamination Robustness Physical Security Data accuracy
Policy Shipment
reliability Disruption Flexibility Information Security Cargo Security
Documentation Shipmenttransparency Corruption Redundancy Freight Security Vessels/ports security
Cooperation and 
Coordination Fault tolerance Resilience Transit Security
Resilience
International Standards
and compatible 
regulations
Physical logistics
layer Endogenous assets
Transaction layer Supply Chain Partners
Oversight layer Exogenous Geographical Factors
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Resilience 
Endogenous assets A9 
Supply Chain Partners 
Exogenous Geographical Factors 
Physical Security B7 
Information Security 
Freight Security 
Data accuracy C2 
Cargo Security 
Vessels/ports security 
Transit Security 
International Standards 
and compatible regulations  
                                                Table 4. Collection of original Elements 
 
 
The Excel file of ANNEX 2: Elements (Colleting-Linking-Classification) has been used of 
support in the process of conceptual linkage of the original elements from the table 
above, getting which this project have been referred as Global Elements. 
 
In the following sections of this project is explained in detail the process followed to 
link conceptually the original elements and are defined in detail the “Global elements” 
obtained. 
 
 
2.4. Linking the Elements: Defining the “Global elements” 
 
Once identified the relevant elements related with the Security and Performance of the 
C.S.C., the next step has been to try link these elements conceptually. 
 
Through this conceptual link, it have tried to obtain some basic elements that 
determine the key points in terms of security and performance of the C.S.C., from the 
literature written about this subject. 
 
Conceptually linking the elements, they have been grouped into 14 basic concepts that 
have been referred like Global Elements in this project. 
 
 
2.4.1. Global Elements (G.E.) 
 
In the following table are exposed the Global Elements generated after the conceptual 
linking of the Elements identified in the documents of the Research Database. 
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Table 5. Global Elements generated 
 
With the objective of generate these Global Elements, has been followed the next 
process: 
• Collect the original elements identified in the documents of the Research 
Database. 
• Analyze the definitions made by the authors, of each of the elements proposed 
in their documents. 
• Link conceptually the original elements together, creating groups of elements 
with the same or similar definitions. 
 
 
2.4.2. Original Elements integrate in each Global Element 
 
In the following section are exposed and defined in detail the original elements 
proposed by the different authors analyzed, which integrate each Global Element. 
 
In this way can be seen that, although with sometimes quite different denominations 
and with definitions a little different, many of the elements proposed by the authors 
have big and obvious points in common. 
 
So, this effectively shows that there are some basic and recurrent elements in the 
literature (which in this project have been referred as Global Elements) that define the 
security and performance of the C.S.C. 
1 Infrastructure and physical security
2 Documentation / Info security
3 Cooperation and coordination
4 Policy, standards and regulations
5 Cargo Security
6 Transit Security
7 Contamination
8 Disruption
9 Corruption
10 Efficiency
11 Reliability / Robustness
12 Shipment Transparency
13 Fault tolerance
14 Resilience
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Thus, the original elements of the authors integrated in each Global Element, with 
their respective definitions are the following: 
 
 
1. Infrastructure and physical security 
 
Infrastructure B5 Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 
Physical logistics layer B6 Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
Endogenous assets A9 Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 
Exogenous Geographical Factors A9 Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 
Physical Security B7 Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 
Vessels/ports security C2 Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 
 
"Infrastructure and physical security" is one of topics most used in the literature in 
connection with the security of the C.S.C. 
 
 
Grillot-Cruise-D'Erman, 2009 (B5) to refer to this element, use the concept of 
Infrastructure. Infrastructure refers to the physical measures taken to enhance port 
security. This includes physical detection methods used at ports of entry and exit. 
Moreover, secure ports are those that can respond to an incident and recover after a 
traumatic event. Response and recovery plans are, therefore, an important element 
related to infrastructure. 
 
Inside of the concept of Infrastructure are included the following elements: 
• Targeting System, Information Data Base and Threat Assessment  use of an 
information database, which includes manifested cargo, origination, transit, 
and destination information, and shipper and shipping histories, to identify 
potentially risky container cargo. 
• Physical Security Measures and Detection Devices  Secure fencing, guards, 
surveillance equipment, and other physical barriers should be in place to limit 
access to port property and containerized freight. Containers themselves 
should incorporate physical security measures, such as seals, that prevent 
and identify tampering. There should also be a means of physically examining 
or screening cargo with appropriate technology. Moreover, ports should 
engage in research and development (R&D) to enhance security operations, 
discovering and implementing stronger security measures and detection 
devices. 
• Training  Personnel involved in port operations should be trained to 
recognize suspect activities, questionable cargo, and appropriate security 
procedures. Such training should also be regularly refreshed. 
• Response and Recovery  In the event of a terrorist or other traumatic event 
at a port of entry/exit, port operations should incorporate rapid response and 
recovery plans. 
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Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6) use the concept of Physical logistics layer. The Physical logistics 
layer is a point of view of the Supply Chain, that view it like a conveyance through 
which products move. The system of roads, tracks, and sea-lanes and the containers 
that flow along them comprise a network, one that provides services to the producers 
and consumers of goods.  
 
In the physical logistics layer, the nodes are all facilities through which the cargo 
travels from origin to destination, and the edges (i.e., the links that connect nodes) are 
the roads, railroad tracks, and sea-lanes on which the cargo moves.  
 
This view of the supply chain merges two perspectives. In OECD (2003), author Philippe 
Crist considered the Physical logistic layer from the points of view of the places 
through which cargo travels and of the people who have access to cargo at various 
stages. 
 
Actions to secure the supply chain follow these figures by limiting the access of people 
to the cargo or by securing the routes and conveyances on which it travels. 
 
 
Image 1. Scheme of the Containerized Supply Chain 
 
 
Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 (A9) to refer to Infrastructure and physical security use 
the concepts of Endogenous Assets and Exogenous geographical factors, defining 
thus, the different physic sources of vulnerability of the Supply Chain. 
 
The concept of Endogenous Assets refers to internal elements of the companies that 
are part of the Supply Chain: equipments, vehicles, human resources and inventories 
of production, distribution, recovery, revalorisation and service centers. 
 
The concept of Exogenous Geographical Factors refers to all elements and factors 
external to firms that are part and influence in the Supply Chain: Nature, public 
infrastructures (travel ways, terminals/ports, telecommunication networks, utilities) 
and socio-economic-political factors. 
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Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 (B7) to refer to this topic, use de concept of 
Physical Security.  
 
The concept of Physical security refers to the provision of physical asset protection for 
organizational infrastructure and facilities.  
 
In terms of the infrastructure security, the authors identified various security measures 
including: access control, badges, cameras, guards and employee checks, and the 
testing of security by an external firm. Facilities security is provided by these measures 
and also focuses on perimeters, policy, procedures and personnel. 
 
 
Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2) to refer to the element of Infrastructure and 
physical security, use the concept of Vessels/ports security. 
 
With the concept of Vessels/ports security, the author addresses the security of 
vessels, facilities and ports. These security procedures are important since the 
protection of the vessel, facility and port, also serves to protect the cargo.  
 
According to the authors, security procedures must be in place to prevent the 
smuggling on board of weapons of mass destruction and other dangerous materials 
while the vessel is in port. These procedures should also prevent illegal migration 
(stowaways). 
 
 
2. Documentation / Info Security 
 
Documentation B5 Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 
Information Security B7 Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 
Data accuracy C2 Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 
 
 
Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 (B5) use the concept of Documentation. With this 
concept, the authors refer to tracing the movement of containers as they enter, 
traverse, and leave the supply chain, as well as checking contents of containers, their 
source, and their destination, through appropriate documentation. It also includes the 
secure transmission of information between the different stakeholders. 
 
Inside of the concept of Documentation are included the following elements: 
• Manifests, Certificates and Verification  Cargo manifests and 
import/export certificates enhance the level of port security by increasing 
the ability to monitor and verify the global movement of goods. 
• Background Checks and Identification Cards  All personnel who are 
involved in the movement of goods through the supply chain should 
undergo a thorough background check and be issued proper identification 
cards. Periodic reviews of identification cards and their issuance should also 
be conducted. 
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Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 (B7), refer to this topic through the concept of 
Information Security. Information Security includes measures to protect both 
Information security and Information assurance, and includes the products, 
procedures and policies that allow the timely transfer of information in an accurate 
and secure way among all parties. 
 
Vulnerabilities in Security Information according to the author: 
• Software. Current software applications have not all been designed with 
security in mind and present significant vulnerabilities for both internal and 
external supply chain environments. Specifically these applications are 
susceptible to trojans, worms and viruses as demonstrated most recently by 
the MS Blaster Worm and have the potential to seriously interrupt 
operations or take down total systems. 
• Hackers. Hackers may gain access to the core systems’ main servers and 
obtain access to very sensitive information, disrupt operations, engage in 
fraudulent practices or take down entire systems. With terrorism on the rise, 
hackers may engage in what is being termed cyber-terrorism imposing 
significant cost, interruption or ineffectiveness on the US economy and/or 
military command and control systems. 
 
Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2) to refer to this topic use the concept of Data 
Accuracy. The concept of Data Accuracy refers to Advance electronic information 
necessary to support the risk assessment of the cargo.  
 
This assessment identifies cargo that may present a threat and thus may require some 
type of intervention. This information is needed early in the process to identify high-
risk cargo before it enters the Maritime Domain. 
 
The objective is to obtain the critical information necessary to assess reliably the risk of 
individual cargo transactions. There are many parties with pieces of information that 
taken together can form a complete picture. The buyers, sellers, shippers and carriers 
form the outline, but the information process is dynamic.  
 
The risk assessment must be equally dynamic, acquiring information from multiple 
sources to capture an end-to-end data perspective on each transaction. 
 
 
 
3. Cooperation and coordination 
 
Cooperation and Coordination B5 Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 
Transaction layer B6 Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
Supply Chain Partners A9 Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 
 
 
Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 (B5) use the concept of Cooperation and Coordination. 
Cooperation and Coordination refers to the activities to obtain a high level of 
cooperation and coordination at all levels of and among all parties involved in trade,  
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This involves the sharing of information, joint practices and interagency and inter-party 
communication, as well as enforcement of rules and regulations and a system of 
accountability that requires joint action.  
 
Ultimately, a secure supply line requires open communication and coordination within 
states, across states, and between varied actors. 
 
 
Inside of the concept of Cooperation and Coordination, the autors includes the 
following elements: 
• Inter-agency Communication and Coordination  All domestic agencies 
involved with the security and movement of freight along the supply chain 
must have open communication and a high level of cooperation among 
them. Regular interaction, coordination, and sharing of information among 
relevant agencies and their officers enhance all their activities, ensure an 
appropriate division of labor, and prevent unnecessary duplication and 
waste. 
• Government and Business Cooperation and Coordination  Programs and 
partnerships between governments and business entities help to ensure the 
security of freight and ports. Bringing the business community into the 
security process allows for their concerns to be addressed and makes them 
even more invested in the structure of the supply chain. 
• International Cooperation and Coordination  Programs and partnerships 
between countries should exist in an effort to share new technologies, 
arrange for and implement collaborative training exercises, and endure the 
adoption of common, harmonized security measures around the world. This 
requires bilateral and multilateral interactions and exchanges on all aspects 
of policy, procedure, and implementation of supply chain security. 
• Information sharing and Privacy protection  Information about shippers, 
exporters, importers, and goods is the key to a secure freight system. 
Therefore, information must be shared with all relevant actors in order to 
detect potentially dangerous transactions. Commercial agents must provide 
manifest information that is accurate, and it must be shared with security 
officials. 
• Enforcement and Accountability  The existence of diligent police and 
investigative authorities who can and do enforce security measures. This 
also requires that there is a means of punishment for those who break the 
laws, including both criminal and civil liabilities. 
 
 
Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6) address this topic through the concept of Transaction layer. The 
Transaction layer is a point of view of the Supply Chain, that view it, like a system that 
procures and distributes goods and that is driven primarily by information flows. From 
this point of view, the supply chain is its network of suppliers and sub-suppliers. 
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This transaction layer connects participants to each other legally through contracts, 
informationally through product specifications, financially through transaction records, 
and physically through the actual product or good. 
 
This transaction-based view of the global supply chain can be represented as the union 
of two interacting networks: an information network and a material network. The 
information network coordinates the flow of goods and payments and is regulated by 
U.S. and international trade law. The material network for a particular firm includes all 
direct and indirect suppliers of goods.  
 
Failures of nodes in the transaction layer are fundamentally different from failures in 
the physical logistics layer.  
 
The transaction layer views the logistics layer as a conveyance mechanism. A failure in 
the transaction layer eliminates the source of a product or the financial flows that 
trigger logistics demands; a failure in the logistical system limits the flow of goods 
through a particular port, rail yard, or truck stop or along a particular route. 
 
The disruption of a supplier (node of the transaction supply chain) affects its 
customers, but a disruption to a port (physical logistic layer) affects all cargo that 
would have passed through it. 
 
Thus the Transaction layer, is the layer where it must interact the business 
stakeholders to agree and determine the amount and direction of the flow of goods 
from one place to another in the Supply Chain System. 
 
 
Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 (A9) to refer to this element use the concept of Supply 
Chain Partners. This concept includes the customers, raw material and energy 
suppliers, subcontractors and third-party logistics providers (3PLs), defining thus, the 
different sources of vulnerability due to supply chain partners and coordination in the 
Supply Chain. 
 
 
4. Policy, standards and regulations 
 
Policy B5 Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 
Oversight layer B6 Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
International Standards 
and compatible regulations  C2 Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 
 
 
Grillot-Cruise-D’Erman, 2009 (B5) use the concept of Policy. Policy refers to the 
regulations taken to enhance port security.  
 
This includes government rules, policies, regulations, laws and procedures that outline 
legal authority and delineate actors and their responsibilities regarding containerized 
freight. 
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Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6) to refer to the topic of “policy, standards and regulations”, use 
the concept of Oversight layer. The Oversight layer is a point of view of the Supply 
Chain, that focuses in implements and enforces rules of behaviour within and among 
the subsystems of the Supply Chain through standards, fines and duties. 
 
This layer of the supply chain includes customs organizations, law enforcement, and 
national and international bodies, and oversees the contracting for and movement of 
goods.  
 
At times, the oversight bodies work within a particular layer of the supply chain 
(physical logistics layer or transaction layer). At other times, the organization must 
interact with both layers. 
 
Each transaction or movement of goods over the supply chain occurs under the 
auspices of a regulatory regime consisting of all the rules, regulations, and 
enforcement mechanisms that govern the structure and operation of the transaction 
and the physical layers of the supply chain.  
 
Each piece of regulatory apparatus collects information to ensure that its directives are 
being met, and these data together form the intelligence that allows targeting of 
shipments. 
 
 
Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2) to refer to this topic, speaks of International 
Standards and compatible regulations. 
 
An important way to achieve a secure supply chain is to engage appropriate 
international organizations in the development of standards. Standards are the only 
meaningful way that the government will be able to ensure that a certain level of 
security across the supply chain can be expected and achieved.  
 
Given the limitations of governmental jurisdiction and direct business influence on the 
international supply chain, we must use international organizations to develop 
minimum acceptable standards for security in international trade.  
International standards play a crucial role in reaching foreign portions of the 
international supply chain that are not influenced by the requirements of any one 
nation. 
 
 
5. Cargo Security 
 
Cargo Security C2 Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 
 
 
Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2) use the concept of Cargo Security. With this 
concept, the autors refer to the Procedure to ensure that the cargo to be loaded on 
the vessel conforms to the cargo information electronically transmitted to the 
authorities.  
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Characteristics of the process: 
• This process connects first-hand knowledge of the cargo with the validation of 
the cargo information.  
• This process also ensures that safeguards are in place to prevent unlawful 
materials (or people) from being combined with the legitimate cargo.  
• Also includes a risk management process that includes the inspection (physical 
inspection and/or the use of non-intrusive inspection equipment) of cargo 
identified as high risk prior to loading at foreign ports and, in some cases, after 
arrival at National port. 
 
This is the most difficult part of the maritime security framework. It consists of the 
development of business security procedures to secure containerized cargo at the 
point of stuffing (loaded into an intermodal container) and that other types of cargo 
are secure before they are loaded on vessels. Since this activity takes place outside the 
United States, there is limited regulatory authority to require specific security 
practices. The Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism has developed security 
criteria that participants must follow when loading containers to prevent illegitimate 
materials from being inserted during this phase of the supply chain. Expanding industry 
and government partnerships, combined with international cooperation, will be 
necessary to embed the essential security procedures into common business practices. 
The second part of secure cargo is the use of risk management and non-intrusive 
inspection equipment to verify that the cargo really is secure. The consequences of a 
nuclear attack through maritime cargo are so great that it must be the first priority. 
The world’s seaports must become a barrier to nuclear proliferation. The longer term 
objective is to develop a large scale capability to detect rapidly the full spectrum of 
weapons of mass destruction or effect which include chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and high explosive threats. 
 
 
6. Transit Security 
 
Transit Security C2 Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 
Freight Security B7 Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 
 
 
Dep. of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2) speak about the concept of Transit Security. 
Transit Security refer to the procedure to Ensure that the secure cargo remains in that 
status as it enters and moves through the Maritime Domain. Successful 
implementation requires a method of detecting that security has been compromised 
during transit and a response protocol to determine if the cargo has remained secure. 
 
It’s necessary a method to verify that the initially secure cargo remains secure 
throughout the journey. For many types of cargo, such as liquid or dry bulk, the vessel 
itself is the cargo container. In these cases, we rely on the security procedures for the 
vessel to secure the cargo during transit. 
 
Containerized cargo presents a different situation. In some ways, containerized cargo 
has two layers of protection since it is protected by the container and by the vessel 
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during the voyage. However, it also is more dangerous because the container may 
have a very long unprotected journey before it is loaded on the vessel. Supply chain 
studies have identified the many vulnerabilities of containerized cargo as it makes it 
way from the inland point where it was loaded until it reaches the harbor.  
 
A secure system must be able to detect whether or not the security of the container 
has been compromised before it is allowed to enter the Maritime Domain. 
 
 
Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 (B7) to refer to the topic of cargo security use 
the concept of Freight Security.   
 
Freight security refers to the packages, pallets and containers, which ship goods and 
products around the world by land, sea and air with security. Security in the 
international supply chain for freight has become one of the highest priorities for the 
US government. After September 11, the highest-order definition of freight security 
changed from theft-proof to tamper-proof. 
 
 
7. Contamination 
 
Contamination A0 Pai-Kallepalli-Caudill-Zhou, 2003 
 
Pai-Kallepalli-Caudill-Zhou, 2003 (A0) define the concept of Contamination like a 
threat to affect the assets that form part of the Supply Chain.  
 
With the concept of Contamination, the authors refer to any form of environmental 
contamination from untreated waste streams, contamination of the raw 
material/manufactured product or contamination of surroundings resulting in 
hazardous environment for the workers. 
 
The threat Contamination is assumed a result of accident or terrorist activity. 
 
 
8. Disruption 
 
Disruption A0 Pai-Kallepalli-Caudill-Zhou, 2003 
 
Pai-Kallepalli-Caudill-Zhou, 2003 (A0) define the concept of Disruption like a threat to 
affect the assets that form part of the Supply Chain.  
 
Disruption can be any form of interruption leading to work halt and it can arise from 
events of natural disaster, terrorism or accidents.  
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9. Corruption 
 
Corruption A0 Pai-Kallepalli-Caudill-Zhou, 2003 
 
Pai-Kallepalli-Caudill-Zhou, 2003 (A0) define the concept of Corruption like a threat to 
affect the assets that form part of the Supply Chain. 
 
Corruption is refered to the terrorist acts of information hacking or tampering and for 
this reason is assumed a result of terrorist activity. 
 
 
10. Efficiency 
 
Efficiency B6 Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
 
Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6) expose that the stability of the global container shipping 
industry is based on efficiency and security. So, the ability of the Global container 
supply chain to deliver goods efficiently and securely can be described through 5 
measurable capabilities. One of these 5 capabilities is defined by the concept of 
Efficiency. 
 
Efficiency is the raison d'etre of the Supply Chain. So, the global container supply chain 
has evolved primarily to deliver goods more quickly and more cheaply than other 
modes of transport when volume and mass are taken into account. 
 
For this reason, initiatives to improve supply chain security must take into account also 
the efficiency parameter, trying to improve or at least not worsen it. 
 
 
11. Reliability / Robustness 
 
Shipment reliability B6 Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
Robustness A9 Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 
 
 
Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6), to speak about this topic develop the concept of Shipment 
reliability. As explained by the authors, the ability of the Global container supply chain 
to deliver goods efficiently and securely can be described through 5 measurable 
capabilities. One of these 5 capabilities is defined by the concept of Shipment 
reliability.  
 
For exists Shipment Reliability in the Supply Chain, it must behave as expected, 
retrieving and delivering goods as directed, with a minimum amount of loss due to 
theft and accident. 
 
Supply chain shrinkage, resulting from misrouting and theft of goods, erodes both the 
reliability and the efficiency of the shipping network. Misrouting causes losses through 
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delays in shipment delivery. Theft results in both direct economic losses and indirect 
losses resulting from delays in product delivery. 
 
 
Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 (A9) to refer to this topic use the concept of Robustness.  
 
The robustness is defined as the extent to which the SC is able to carry its functions for 
a variety of plausible future scenarios. 
SC is robust, for the planning horizon considered, if it is capable of providing 
sustainable value creation under all plausible future scenarios (normal business 
conditions as well as major disruptions). 
 
 
12. Shipment Transparency 
 
Shipment transparency B6 Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
 
 
Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6), to speak about this topic develop the concept of Shipment 
transparency. As explained by the authors, the ability of the Global container supply 
chain to deliver goods efficiently and securely can be described through 5 measurable 
capabilities. One of these 5 capabilities is defined by the concept of Shipment 
transparency.  
 
To obtain a Shipment transparency, the goods that flow through a supply chain must 
be legitimately represented to authorities and must be legal for transport. 
 
 
The system should be transparent enough to minimize improper use of the system. 
Traditionally, transparency has involved inspections at the port of entry to detect 
illegal immigrants or items being smuggled in an attempt to avoid regulations or tariffs.  
 
With homeland security currently receiving so much attention, the focus of exclusion 
has shifted to preventing terrorists from using the container shipping system to carry 
out attacks on the United States. Inspection at the port of entry can make it more 
difficult for terrorists to use containerized shipping as logistical support for moving 
people and supplies. However, inspections at the port of entry are less helpful for 
preventing terrorists from using containers as a means of attack (e.g., detonating a 
bomb aboard a ship arriving at port). 
 
 
13. Fault tolerance 
 
Fault tolerance B6 Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
Flexibility A9 Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 
Redundancy A9 Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 
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Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6), to speak about this topic develop the concept of Fault 
Tolerance. As explained by the authors, the ability of the Global container supply chain 
to deliver goods efficiently and securely can be described through 5 measurable 
capabilities. One of these 5 capabilities is defined by the concept of Fault Tolerance. 
 
The concept of Fault Tolerance indicates that the container shipping system should be 
able to respond to disruptions and failures of isolated components without bringing 
the entire system to a grinding halt. 
 
Because the system is a network, problems at one node—such as a port—affect 
interconnected parts of the system. In unstable systems, a problem at a single node or 
link in the supply chain can bring the entire network to a halt. In fault-tolerant systems, 
the surrounding ports and distribution system can compensate when a section of the 
system is compromised. To the extent that neighboring ports and facilities are able to 
compensate for the loss of a port, the containerized shipping system is more fault 
tolerant. 
 
 
Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 (A9) to refer to the topic of Fault Tolerance use the 
concepts of Flexibility and Redundancy based capabilities. 
 
Flexibility based capabilities are developed by investing in SC structures and resources 
before they are needed. 
 
Redundancy based capabilities involve a duplication of network resources in order to 
continue serving customers while rebuilding after a disruption.  
An important distinction between flexibility and redundancy based capabilities is that 
the latter may not be used. 
 
 
Examples of design decisions providing Flexibility based capabilities include selecting 
production/warehousing systems that can support several product types and real-time 
changes, choosing suppliers that are partially interchangeable, and locating 
distribution centers to ensure that all customers can be supplied by a back-up center 
with a reasonable service level if its primary supplier fails. 
 
 
Examples of Redundancy based capabilities include insurance capacity, that is 
maintaining production systems in excess of business-as-usual requirements, and 
insurance inventory dedicated to serve as buffers in critical situations. 
 
Both flexibility and redundancy collaborate on improving the capacity of 
Responsiveness of the Supply Chain. The Responsiveness aims at providing an 
adequate response to short-term variations in supply, capacity and demand. 
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14. Resilience 
 
Resilience B6 Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
Resilience A9 Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 
 
 
Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6), to speak about this topic develop the concept of Resilience. As 
explained by the authors, the ability of the Global container supply chain to deliver 
goods efficiently and securely can be described through 5 measurable capabilities. One 
of these 5 capabilities is defined by the concept of Fault Tolerance. 
 
Resilience is the ability of the supply chain to return to normal operations after a 
failure. Resilience is a function of the system design and the response from the 
oversight layer 
 
A supply chain is resilient insofar as it is able to return to normal operating conditions 
quickly after the failure of one or more components. Resilience is a function of both 
the system’s design and the responsiveness of the oversight layer. 
 
For example, suppose that an oil spill occurs at a port. The response to contain the spill 
would impede the loading and unloading of ships, creating backlogs at the port and 
delaying shipments elsewhere. The more resilient the supply chain is, the quicker these 
backlogs will be cleared, avoiding the resulting delays. 
 
 
Klibi-Martel-Guitouni, 2009 (A9), speak about the concept of Resilience, too. For this 
autors, the concept of Resilience is defined as the capacity of a system to survive, 
adapt, and grow in the face of unforeseen changes, even catastrophic incidents 
 
The Resilience of the Supply Chain can be seen as a strategic posture of deployed 
resources (facilities, systems capacity and inventories), suppliers and product-markets, 
as a physical insurance against SC risk exposure, providing the means to avoid 
disruptions as much as possible, as well as the means to bounce back quickly when hit. 
 
The authors conclude from empirical studies that business is in need of resilience 
strategies to deal effectively with unexpected disruptions. The main challenge is to 
elaborate resilience strategies providing an adequate protection from disruptions 
without reducing the SCN effectiveness in business-as-usual situations. This can be 
done by avoiding or transferring risks, and/ or by investing in flexible and redundant 
network structures. 
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2.4.3. Global Elements VS Authors 
 
Once generated the Global Elements, the next step was to measure how frequently are used each of these Global Elements in the literature 
studied. 
 
To this end, have been developed a Table of Global Elements VS authors. In this table has scored for each of the Global Elements, which 
authors propose an element integrated in this Global Element. 
 
So, can be easily analyzed the Global Elements which are more proposed by the authors in the analyzed literature. 
 
 
Grillot-Cruise-
D’Erman, 2009 
Willis-
Ortiz, 2004 
Pai-Kallepalli-Caudill-
Zhou, 2003 
Klibi-Martel-
Guitouni, 2009  
Hauser-Graham-
Koerner-Davis, 2004 
Dep. of Homeland 
Security, 2005 
1 Infrastructure and physical security 1 1   1 1 1 5 
2 Documentation / Info security 1     1 1 3 
3 Cooperation and coordination 1 1   1     3 
4 Policy, standards and 
regulations 1 1       1 3 
5 Cargo Security         1 1 2 
6 Transit security           1 1 
7 Contamination     1       1 
8 Disruption     1       1 
9 Corruption     1       1 
10 Efficiency   1         1 
11 Reliability / Robustness   1   1     2 
12 Shipment Transparency   1         1 
13 Fault tolerance   1   1     2 
14 Resilience 
  1   1     2 
Table 6. Global Elements VS Authors
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So, from the table above, can be extracted that highlights the global element 
“Infrastructure and physical security” as the most proposed in the literature analyzed. 
 
Can also be extracted, that in this literature are also especially relevant the Global 
Elements “Documentation and Info Security”, “Cooperation and Coordination” and 
“Policy, Standards and Regulations”. 
 
 
2.4.4. Conceptual Definition of each Global Element 
 
To determine more precisely the Global Elements resulting of link conceptually the 
identified elements in the Research Database, has been developed an integrative 
conceptual definition of each Global Element. 
 
So, although with sometimes quite different denominations and with definitions a little 
different, many of the elements proposed by the authors have big and obvious points 
in common. 
 
 
The process followed to define conceptually each Global Element is as follows: 
• Analysis of the definition given by the authors of each element integrated into 
the Global Element. 
• Extraction of the key and basic idea that these elements are intended to 
convey. 
• Development of a conceptual definition integrative taking into account all the 
definitions and trying to capture the key common idea extracted from all the 
definitions. 
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Below are the definitions generated for each Global Element: 
 
Table 7. Global Elements 
 
1. Infrastructure and physical security 
 
The most used Global Element is “Infrastructure and Physical Security”. Lots of authors 
speak of it under various designations. 
Although the descriptions and definitions given by the authors are slightly different, 
the latter concept is the same. 
 
All the definitions refer to the physical elements that make up the Supply Chain 
(public infrastructure and private facilities and items) and the physical measures 
used to protect these vital elements of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
2. Documentation / Info security 
 
Regarding the elements integrated in this Global Element, the authors also defined in 
different ways but there are strong and obvious points in common in all these 
definitions. 
All the definitions refer to the management of the documentation and information 
accurately and securely throughout the supply chain. Through the improvement and 
optimization of the management of this documentation and information, is intended 
to strengthen both the security and efficiency of the Supply Chain. 
1 Infrastructure and physical security
2 Documentation / Info security
3 Cooperation and coordination
4 Policy, standards and regulations
5 Cargo Security
6 Transit Security
7 Contamination
8 Disruption
9 Corruption
10 Efficiency
11 Reliability / Robustness
12 Shipment Transparency
13 Fault tolerance
14 Resilience
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So, can be improved both monitoring and security control of the various components 
(containers, personnel) that run through the Supply Chain. 
 
 
3. Cooperation and coordination 
 
All the elements included within this Global Element can also be merged conceptually 
on a common definition. 
Thus, all dealing with the different activities to be performed to obtain a high degree 
of cooperation and coordination. 
All authors agree on the importance of carrying out actions to facilitate such 
cooperation and coordination from local to international level between all parties 
involved in the Supply Chain. 
Thus, the authors note that if not carried out these actions, the Supply chain partners 
can become a source of vulnerability for the own supply chain. 
 
 
4. Policies, standards and regulations 
 
Several authors stress the importance of the regulation and standardization to 
improve the security of the Containerized Supply Chain 
 
Thus, although the authors define this concept in different ways, all these definitions 
can be lumped conceptually. 
 
The authors refer to the implementation of rules of conduct with respect to different 
elements of the Supply Chain through legislation, standardization and regulation, as 
a way to generate an environment favorable to the security of the Supply Chain. 
 
This requires the existence of national and international organizations, so that 
regulation can be made at the highest level and to be fully compatible across the 
entire supply chain. 
 
 
5. Cargo Security 
 
Conceptually, this element is defined by the authors as the Procedure to ensure that 
the cargo to be loaded on the vessel conforms to the cargo information electronically 
transmitted to the authorities. 
 
 
 
 
Elements to evaluate the Security of the C.S.C. Pedro Vizcaino Moreno 
38 
 
6. Transit Security 
 
Several authors discuss the global element and Transit Security, albeit with different 
denominations can be defined conceptually as the procedures to apply at the 
different elements of the Supply Chain to Ensure that the secure cargo remains in 
that status as it enters and moves through the Supply Chain 
 
 
7. Contamination 
 
Conceptually, this element is defined by the authors as any form of environmental 
contamination from untreated waste streams, contamination of the raw 
material/manufactured product or contamination of surroundings, resulting in 
hazardous environment for the workers and other people. 
 
The threat Contamination is assumed a result of accident or terrorist activity and is a 
threat that affect the assets and the personnel that form part of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
8. Disruption 
 
Conceptually, this element is defined by the authors as any form of interruption 
leading to work halt and it can arise from events of natural disaster, terrorism or 
accidents. 
 
So, this element is a threat that affect the assets that form part of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
9. Corruption 
 
Conceptually, this element is defined by the authors as the terrorist acts, information 
hacking or tampering and for this reason is assumed as a result of terrorist activity. 
 
So, this element is a threat that affect the assets that form part of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
 
10. Efficiency 
 
Conceptually, this element is defined by the authors as the raison d’être of the Supply 
Chain. So, the global container supply chain has evolved primarily to deliver goods 
more quickly and more cheaply than other modes of transport when volume and 
mass are taken into account. 
 
For this reason, initiatives to improve supply chain security must take into account 
also the efficiency parameter, trying to improve or at least not worsen it. 
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11. Reliability 
 
Several authors discuss this Global element in relation to the security of the 
Containerized Supply Chain. 
 
The denominations given of this concept by the authors don’t match exactly, but 
conceptually have obvious similarities. 
 
Thus, merging the definitions, can be defined this global element as follows: 
 
For exists Reliability in the Supply Chain, it must behave as expected, retrieving and 
delivering goods as directed, with a minimum amount of loss due to theft and 
accident, and providing sustainable value creation under all plausible future 
scenarios (normal business conditions as well as major disruptions) 
 
 
12. Shipment Transparency 
 
According to the authors definition, to obtain a shipment transparency, the goods 
that flow through a supply chain must be legitimately represented to authorities and 
must be legal for transport. So, the system should be transparent enough to 
minimize improper use of the system. 
 
 
13. Fault tolerance 
 
Several authors discuss the global element of Fault Tolerance, albeit with different 
denominations can be obtained a common and inclusive definition. 
 
The concept of Fault Tolerance indicates that the container shipping system should 
be able to respond to disruptions and failures of isolated components without 
bringing the entire system to a grinding halt. 
 
In fault-tolerant systems, the surrounding ports and distribution system can 
compensate when a section of the system is compromised through flexibility or 
redundancy based capabilities. 
 
 
14. Resilience 
 
The concept of Resilience is treated by several authors. Integrating their definitions, 
can be determined precisely what is this important element related to the security of 
the C.S.C. 
 
So, Resilience is the ability of the supply chain to return to normal operations after a 
failure. A supply chain is resilient insofar as it is able to return to normal operating 
conditions quickly after the failure of one or more components. 
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It is the capacity of a system to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of unforeseen 
changes, even catastrophic incidents 
 
 
2.4.5. Classification of the Global Elements 
 
In the process of generation of the conceptual definition of the Global Elements, have 
been identified a clear difference of nature between those Global Elements. 
 
So, have been identified 3 major subgroups in which can be classified the 14 Global 
Elements. 
 
In this way, have been identified a group of Global Elements relating to all those basic 
elements, tools and procedures that define the Security of the C.S.C. This group of 
Global Elements, in this project, has been named as Tools. 
 
Another group of Global elements relating to the possible problems that may affect in 
a negative way in the operation of the C.S.C. This group of Global Elements has been 
named as Vulnerabilities. 
 
And finally, another group of Global Elements relating to all elements that define the 
performance of the C.S.C. This group of elements has been named as Performance. 
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Tools 
1 Infrastructure and physical security 
2 Documentation / Info security 
3 Cooperation and coordination 
4 Policy, standards and regulations 
5 Cargo Security 
6 Transit security 
Vulnerabilities 
7 Contamination 
8 Disruption 
9 Corruption 
Performance 
10 Efficiency 
11 Reliability 
12 Shipment Transparency 
13 Fault tolerance 
14 Resilience 
Table 8. Classification of the Global Elements 
 
Thus, the above table indicates how the Global Elements are grouped after being 
classified through the parameters indicated in the preceding paragraphs. 
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So, there are a group of 6 Global Elements that, indeed, refer to those basic elements, 
tools and procedures that define the Security of the C.S.C.: 
• Infrastructure and Physical security 
• Documentation and Info security 
• Cooperation and coordination 
• Policy, standards and regulations 
• Cargo Security 
• Transit Security 
 
Another group of 3 Global Elements relating to the vulnerabilities that may affect the 
normal operation of the Supply Chain: 
• Contamination 
• Disruption 
• Corruption 
 
And finally a group of 5 Global Elements that define the Performance of the C.S.C.: 
• Efficiency 
• Reliability 
• Shipment Transparency 
• Fault Tolerance 
• Resilience 
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3. Proposed and implemented Measures to improve the Security of the 
C.S.C. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this section there is a collection of the various Measures proposed and implemented 
to improve the Security of the C.S.C. identificated in the specialized literature. 
 
There are two distinct levels in terms of these measures. So, there are those that have 
been referred to as Agreement Measures and those that have been referred to as 
Technological Measures. 
 
Within the Agreement Measures are included all efforts made regarding the creation 
of national and international agreements, policies, performance standards, rules and 
programs. 
 
Within the Technological Measures are included all those technologies used or in 
developing to improve and strengthen the security of the C.S.C. in the various levels of 
the supply chain and in different focal areas. 
 
Thus, in the following sections will be collected and explained each of the measures 
identified in the literature analyzed. 
 
The documents that have been used with more relevance for the collection and 
analysis of the measures are: 
 
 Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain [Willis-Ortiz, 2004] (B6) 
 
 Container security. A proposal for a comprehensive code of conduct [Dahlman-Mackby-
Alewine, 2005] (B9) 
 
 Maritime Commerce Security Plan for The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
[Department of Homeland Security, 2005] (C2) 
 
 Protecting the Nation's Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost [Haveman-Shatz, 2006] (C9) 
 
 A Fully Integrated Global Strategic Supply Network [Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004] 
(B7) 
 
 Transportation security technologies: research and development [Hallowell-Jankowski, 
2006] (D0) 
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 The Container Security Initiative and Ocean Container Threats [Haveman-Jennings-Shatz-
Wright, 2007] (C6) 
 
 Security Supply Chain [Dias-Fontana-Mori-Facioli-Zancul, 2008] (D3) 
 
 Higher supply chain security with lower cost: Lessons from total quality management [Lee-
Whang, 2003] (D4) 
 
 National and Global Efforts to Enhance Containerized Freight Security [Grillot-Cruise-
D’Erman, 2009] (B5) 
 
 
3.2. Agreement Measures 
 
Through the analysis of the specialized literature, have been identified the Agreement 
Measures proposed or implemented in the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction of this section, in the concept of Agreement 
Measures are included all those efforts made regarding the creation of national and 
international agreements, policies, performance standards, rules. 
 
Thus, the Agreement Measures identified in the literature are the following, and will 
be explained below: 
• Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) 
• Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
• Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
• Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) 
• Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
• Megaports Initiative 
• International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) 
 
 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) 
 
The majority of the post-September 11 laws, rules, regulations, and programs in 
relation with the Security of the Supply Chain, have their origin in MTSA. Among other 
steps, the act required [Haveman-Shatz, 2006 (C9)]: 
• The creation of national, area, facility, and vessel security plans; 
• The identification by federal authorities of vessels and U.S. facilities at risk; 
• The creation of vessel and facility response plans; 
• Transportation security cards for people who have access to vessels and 
facilities and crewmember identification cards; 
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• The creation of rapid-response maritime safety and security teams; 
• An assessment of antiterrorism efforts at foreign ports; 
• The placement of automatic identification systems on vessels in U.S. waters 
and a long-range vessel tracking system; 
• The development of a program to evaluate and certify secure. 
• Systems of international cargo shipment 
• A new grant program 
 
These requirements establish standards and protocols for port security, inspections, 
and emergency response. MTSA is the U.S. version of the IMO’s International Ship and 
Port Security. As final goal, the MTSA aims reducing theft and improving incident 
response at ports and on vessels [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
 
 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
 
The goal of Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is to push 
responsibility for cargo security onto stakeholders in the supply chain.  
 
So, C-TPAT is a voluntary program that shippers and carriers can enter to assure at CBP 
(U.S. Customs and Border Protection) that they have put into place the best security 
practices for the packing, tracking, and distribution of all containers and goods en 
route to the United States. In return, shippers and carriers are rewarded through 
quicker processing and reduced probability of inspection delays [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
(B6)]. 
 
The C-TPAT is a joint U.S. government-business initiative to build cooperative 
relationships that strengthen overall supply chain and border security. C-TPAT 
recognizes that U.S. Customs can provide a high level of security only through close 
cooperation with the ultimate owners of the supply chain—importers, carriers, 
brokers, warehouse operators and manufacturers [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)].  
 
In C-TPAT, the Customs Borders and Protection (CBP) has partnered with the trade 
community to implement security criteria and best practices that better protect the 
entire supply chain.  
 
C-TPAT uses the leverage that major importers have over their suppliers to improve 
security. C-TPAT importers go as far as mandating security procedures in their 
contracts with foreign suppliers, specifying the security procedures that must be 
observed before products are loaded and shipped to the United States [Department of 
Homeland Security, 2005 (C2)]. 
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The Participants sign an agreement that commits them to conduct a comprehensive 
self-assessment of supply chain security guidelines [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 
(B9)]. 
 
Businesses must apply to participate in C-TPAT and in so doing, commit to the 
following actions [Haveman-Shatz, 2006 (C9)]: 
• Conduct a comprehensive self-assessment of supply chain security using the C-
TPAT security guidelines, jointly developed by Customs and Border Protection 
and the trade community. These guidelines encompass procedural security, 
physical security, personnel security, education and training, access controls, 
manifest procedures and conveyance security. 
• Submit a supply chain security profile questionnaire to Customs and Border 
Protection. 
• Develop and implement a program to enhance security throughout the supply 
chain in accordance with C-TPAT guidelines. 
• Communicate C-TPAT guidelines to other companies in the supply chain and 
work toward building the guidelines into relationships with these companies. 
 
U.S. Customs offers potential benefits to C-TPAT members, including [Dahlman-
Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]:  
• A reduced number of inspections (reduced border times)  
• An assigned account manager 
• Access to the C-TPAT membership list 
• Eligibility for account-based processes (bimonthly/monthly payments) 
• An emphasis on self-policing, rather than customs verifications.  
 
In summary, C-TPAT rewards importers who elevate their security measures and 
make their internal procedures more transparent by offering reduced numbers of 
border inspections. 
 
According to information provided directly by the Customs and Border Protection 
website (http://www.cbp.gov), the C-TPAT validated 3,469 supply chains in 2008 which 
is 377 more validations than conducted in 2007. 
 
In addition, since 2003 and as of December 31, 2008, C-TPAT performed 10,367 total 
initial validations and revalidations. 
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Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
 
The goal of CSI is to make more difficult to transport illegal shipments to the United 
States by implementing inspections at ports of origin, thus increasing U.S. security. 
 
So, the CSI is a set of measures designed to move the process of container screening 
toward the beginning of the supply chain and it includes increased efforts to 
[Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]:   
• Prescreen containers more effectively 
• Make sure that containers are more secure in transit 
• Have technology in place at the port of overseas departure for inspection of 
high-risk containers.  
 
CSI is based on the idea of pushing U.S. border controls beyond actual U.S. borders 
and intercepting dangerous cargo before it arrives in the United States. It is best 
known for inspecting high-risk containers at foreign ports [Haveman-Shatz, 2006 (C9)]. 
 
The objective is to ensure that containers headed for the United States are secure 
before they leave a foreign port. Waiting for the container to arrive at a U.S. 
destination before inspecting it would probably be too late to prevent a catastrophic 
result. Thus, the CSI consists of four core elements [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine,2005 (B9)]: 
• Using intelligence and automated information to identify and target high-risk 
containers 
• Pre-screening those containers identified as high risk at the port of departure 
• Employing detection technology to rapidly pre-screen high-risk containers 
• Using smarter tamper-proof containers. 
 
The CSI has quickly expanded to major foreign seaports from which the majority of 
container shipments to the United States originate.  
Through bilateral agreements, Customs and Border Protection officers are stationed at 
foreign seaports where they work with the host government to identify high-risk 
shipments before they are shipped to the United States [Department of Homeland 
Security, 2005 (C2)].  
 
This innovative program became possible because of [Department of Homeland Security, 
2005 (C2)]: 
• The availability of advance electronic cargo information. 
• Automated tools such as the Automated Targeting System to use that 
information. 
• Non-intrusive inspection technology to efficiently inspect high-risk containers. 
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• An international community committed to the improvement of maritime 
security.  
 
The United States has concluded agreements with some 25 ports globally, including 
Rotterdam, Antwerp, Le Havre, Singapore, and Hong Kong, that provide for U.S. 
customs officers to be permanently placed at these ports far and it has offered 
reciprocity to other countries so that they, too, can station customs officers in U.S. 
ports for ships bound to their countries (to date only Japan and Canada have done so) 
[Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine,2005 (B9)]. 
 
However, if all countries reciprocated in the CSI by sending customs officers to each 
others’ ports, there would be an overabundance of officials among the containers. This 
points to the central deficiency in the CSI: it consists of bilateral agreements rather 
than a global arrangement to secure global container transport [Dahlman-Mackby-
Alewine, 2005 (B9)]. 
 
 
Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) 
 
The OSC is a collaborative effort between the federal government, business interests, 
and the maritime industry to develop and share best practices for the safe and 
expeditious movement of containerized cargo. Through a set of grants, OSC is 
promoting the testing, evaluation, and fielding of container scanning and tracking 
technologies [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
 
So, Operation Safe Commerce is an initiative to evaluate the effectiveness of various 
news technologies and business practices in ensuring international supply chain and 
container security [Department of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2)].  
 
OSC funds pilot programs that are meant to enhance and complement other security 
initiatives, such as C-TPAT and CSI, by testing the new technologies and business 
processes. 
 
The programs are used to identify vulnerabilities in the supply chain and develop 
improved methods for ensuring the security of the C.S.C. entering and leaving the 
United States. Those security techniques that prove successful under the program are 
to be recommended for implementation in system-wide [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine,2005 
(B9)].  
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In the programs, the containers are fitted with the new technologies and treated with 
the new business processes, and are exposed to actual shipping conditions. They also 
are monitored for logistics and security anomalies. 
 
For a project to be funded, it must accomplish one or more of the following tasks to 
secure the supply chain [Haveman-Shatz, 2006 (C9)]: 
• Validate security at the point of origin, to include the security of the shipment 
itself and the information that describes it. 
• Secure the supply chain from the point of origin to its final destination and all 
the points in between. 
• Monitor the movement and integrity of the cargo while in transit using 
available technology. 
 
Has already been initiated a $58 million joint pilot program in Seattle, Los Angeles and 
New York ports, involving collaboration between industry, ports and local, state and 
federal governments [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine,2005 (B9)]. 
 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related 
material [Department of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2)]. 
 
The PSI is focused on pre-emptive interdiction: it seeks to allow ships, aircraft and 
vehicles suspected of carrying WMD-related materials to be detained and searched as 
soon as they enter member countries' territory, territorial waters, or airspace 
[Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine,2005 (B9)].  
 
For that reason, states and non-state actors concerned about this proliferation, have 
developed partnerships and are cooperating in interdiction exercises. 
 
To avoid the violation of international law (for example the Law of the Sea), bilateral 
arrangements are made to board vessels and aircraft and/or guide these to 
participating States [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine,2005 (B9)]. 
 
This effort shows the clear commitment of the international community that the global 
transportation system will not be used to support weapons of mass destruction 
proliferation. 
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Several exercises have been held, which also have the function of deterring the 
transport of such materials. Currently (01-01-2011) the PSI has 98 states participating 
countries, among which highlight Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States, as a members 
of the Operational Experts Group. 
 
 
Megaports Initiative 
 
The Megaport Initiative began in 2003 as a cooperative effort between the U.S. and 
the host countries to add radiation detection capabilities to exterior key ports. This 
will make it possible to screen cargo for nuclear and radiological weapons of mass 
destruction [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine,2005 (B9)].  
 
The U.S. supports the installation of the equipment, training and maintenance, while 
equipment is operated by host country personnel. 
 
The Megaports Initiative will also provide training to appropriate law enforcement 
officials to provide them with the technical means to deter, detect, and interdict illicit 
trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. This expertise is based on years 
of experience equipping international seaports, airports and vehicle crossings with 
radiation detection and related communications equipment and response systems 
[Department of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2)].  
 
Since the start of the Megaports Initiative in fiscal year 2003, has been completed 
installations at 27 ports to date (2010) in: Bahamas, Belgium, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Greece, Honduras (SFI Port), Israel, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Oman (SFI Port), Pakistan (SFI Port), Panama, the Philippines, Portugal, 
Spain, Singapore, South Korea (SFI Port), Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United 
Kingdom (SFI Port). Implementation is underway at 16 ports in the following locations: 
Bangladesh, China, Djibouti, Dubai-United Arab Emirate, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, and Spain. 
 
The Megaports Initiative seeks to equip 100 seaports with radiation detection systems 
by 2015, scanning approximately 50 percent of global maritime containerized cargo. 
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International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) 
 
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) provides mandatory security requirements 
for governments, port authorities and shipping companies, as well as voluntary 
guidelines about how to meet the new security requirements [Dahlman-Mackby-
Alewine,2005 (B9)].  
 
The ISPS is the germ of initiatives in relation to the Security of the C.S.C. at international 
level, as well as the MTSA is at the U.S. level. 
 
Under the ISPS, the operators of seaports must conduct vulnerability assessments 
and develop and submit for approval security plans for their ports. The plans must 
meet the threats against varying security levels (normal, medium and high threat 
situations) that would be set by the contracting Government [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 
2005 (B9)].  
 
The seagoing vessels are now required to undergo a vulnerability assessment to 
develop and implement a security plan, including a provision for security officers, and 
to install an Automatic Identification Systems on board which can be interrogated. 
The imposed security level creates a link between a ship, the port facility, and the 
threat situation [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine,2005 (B9)]. 
 
The Code does not specify specific measures that each port and ship must take to 
ensure the security of the facility against terrorism because of the many different types 
and sizes of these facilities. Instead it outlines “a standardized, consistent framework 
for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset changes in threat with changes in 
vulnerability for ships and port facilities” (ISPS Code) 
 
For ships the framework includes requirements for (ISPS Code): 
• Ship security plans 
• Ship security officers 
• Company security officers 
• Certain onboard equipment 
 
For port facilities, the requirements include (ISPS Code): 
• Port facility security plans 
• Port facility security officers 
• Certain security equipment 
 
In addition the requirements for ships and for port facilities include (ISPS Code): 
• Monitoring and controlling access 
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• Monitoring the activities of people and cargo 
• Ensuring security communications are readily available 
 
In October 2003 the EU required the mandatory adoption by EU Member States of 
many of the voluntary measures of the ISPS code. The new code came into effect on 1 
July 2004 and applies to ships larger than 500 gross tons.  
In order to prepare for this development, a public/private partnership including 
government, port authorities, ship owners, industries, and unions produced a manual 
for ship and port security assessment given to the IMO, EU and the World Bank. 
 
 
3.3. Technological Measures 
 
Through the analysis of the specialized literature, have been identified the 
Technological Measures proposed or implemented regarding the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction of this section, in the concept of 
Technological Measures are included all these technologies used or under 
development to improve and strengthen the Security of the C.S.C. at various levels in 
the supply chain and in different focal areas. 
 
Thus, the Technological Measures identified are the following, and it will be explained 
below: 
• Antitamper Seals Technologies 
• Sensor Technologies 
• Radio-Frequency Identification Technologies 
• Non-Intrusive Inspections Technologies: X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Scanning 
• WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies: Radiation Pagers and Portal Sensors 
• Automated Targeting Technologies 
• Authentication Technologies: Access Control and Biometrics 
 
Antitamper Seals Technologies 
 
Antitamper seals are a broad set of technologies that detect and indicate when an 
unauthorized party has opened a container.  
 
They range from electronic devices that record when and by whom containers are 
opened, until proposals to mark containers with unique “fingerprints” that are 
modified when a container is opened or compromised. Even the simplest antitamper 
seals, such as high-quality cable seals, are considerably more expensive than common 
bolt seals [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
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Image 2. Examples of Antitamper Seals Technologies 
 
They can be used in combination with RFID technology to optimize its functionality, 
making use of the advantages of RFID explained in later sections of this project. 
 
Seals should be tamperproof and should carry a unique identification that cannot be 
forged easily. The procedures and authorities to apply seals must be clearly defined. 
There is a need to establish some minimal standards. The World Customs Organization 
has a high-level group to address standardization in container transport, including 
seals. The International Standardization Organization (ISO) is also reportedly preparing 
an international standard for seals [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]. 
 
A number of institutions and companies (Boeing, QinetiQ, Philips, Joint Research Center 
of the European Commission, and others) have instituted research and development 
programs on these security technological measures, including also smart seals and 
“brilliant containers” with built-in detectors.  
 
 
Sensors Technologies 
 
The containers with sensors can detect intrusion and other actions that might breach 
security of the container and, detect radiological materials, or specified chemical or 
biological agents. Sensors can either produce real time alerts, or communicate with a 
secure device to record events and when they occurred for later recovery. [Dahlman-
Mackby-Alewine,2005 (B9)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 3. Sensor to detect flammable chemical elements 
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Such sensors are being developed and tested. If such devices prove to be reliable and 
cost effective, they could become an important part of the solution to the problem of 
container security. 
 
 
Radio-Frequency Identification Technologies 
 
RFID technologies allow shippers and carriers to track cargo while it is within the 
container shipping system. The devices can record and transmit information about a 
container’s origin, destination, contents, or processing history [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)].  
 
RFID systems are typically designed to transmit information about cargo when the 
shipment passes salient portals, such as entry or exit from a port or when the cargo 
is loaded or unloaded from a ship [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)].  
 
RFID devices are available as both passive and active technologies. Passive devices 
transmit only when are in the presence of a reader that provides the required power. 
They have ranges up to a few meters and are typically used to track shipments at the 
unit or carton level. Active devices are battery powered and can transmit over 
distances as far as 100m or more. Thus, active devices have been applied to tracking 
cargo at the container and pallet levels. 
Image 4. Examples of different elements of the RFID Technologies  
(a-passive Tag; b-active Tag; c-RFID reader) 
 
Advantages of using RFID [Hauser-Graham-Koerner-Davis, 2004 (B7)]: 
• RFID coupled with the right infrastructure, will provide at business processes 
real time information to feed future adaptive supply networks. 
• RFID has significant potential to reduce handling costs, improve information 
accuracy and visibility, and improve the planning of inventory required to 
support both business requirements. 
• RFID has significant security applications to aid current and future initiatives in 
tracking the handling of freight and cargo. 
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• As RFID costs reduce with volume of usage it will be progressively extended 
from supply chain containers and packages, to high value / secure items and 
eventually to low value items. 
• Devices will be generational and develop toward the emerging technologies of 
smart dust and intelligent devices over the next 5 to 10 years. 
 
 
Non-Intrusive inspections Technologies: X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Scanning 
 
The Non-Intrusive inspections technologies, as X-Ray and Gamma-Ray technologies 
allow to visualize for inspections of a container’ contents, obviating the need to open 
it and inspect the contents physically [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Image 5. Fix X-ray Scanner                             Image 6. Portable Gamma-ray Scanner 
 
 
 
These technologies are used to scan containers for misrepresented or illegal shipments. 
  
Currently, between 5 and 6 percent of containers are inspected either intrusively or 
nonintrusively. Application has been limited because of the cost of the machines, the 
lack of space at ports, the time required to scan, and the relatively high false-positive 
rates that result from the inconclusive visualizations that the technologies provide 
[Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
 
The X-ray and Gamma-Ray machines reveal much information about the contents of 
containers and are being used in some large ports. 
 
The principle of operation of X-ray and Gamma-Ray equipment for inspection is 
relatively simple. A Ray generator, which is usually an electron tube in conventional 
small-size equipment and a particle accelerator in large-size equipment, is energized 
by a power circuit, thus generating X or Gamma rays. The object is then traversed by 
the ray beam, and in function of its content density, it absorbs more or less energy 
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from the beam, and the rays that traversed this object hit a column of photosensor 
diodes, sensitive to the rays, which emit an electric pulse. 
Analog to digital converters change these pulses in signals that are processed and 
finally converted in a digital image on a monitor. This radioscopic image shows the 
content of the object inspected [Dias-Fontana-Mori-Facioli-Zancul, 2008 (D3)]. 
 
 
WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies: Radiation Pagers, Portal Sensors 
 
Nuclear material, especially material that might be part of a nuclear weapon or is 
intended to be used to produce a nuclear weapon, is of special concern.  
 
Technologies for the remote sensing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are under 
development and are technologies that allow detect weapons of mass destruction, 
their delivery systems and related material [Department of Homeland Security, 2005 
(C2)]. 
 
Radioactive materials give off neutrons, gamma rays and heat, which, in principle, 
allows them to be detected. However, it is difficult to generalize what can be detected 
in practice, since this depends strongly of [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]: 
• The nature and quantity of the radioactive material. 
• The others materials present that can act as shielding. 
• The sensitivity of the monitoring device. 
 
In the WMB Remote monitoring devices, highlight [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]: 
• Radiation pagers: are portable devices that can be used to detect nuclear or 
radiological weapons as inspectors move throughout a port or vessel.  
• Portal sensors: are designed to detect weapons of mass destruction as 
containers enter and leave ports or vessels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               
                      
            Image 7. Radiation Pager                                     Image 8. Portal Sensor 
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These and other remote-monitoring devices to detect weapons of mass destruction 
and other illegal cargo are in early development. However, capabilities are expected to 
improve over time and possibly be integrated with existing security technologies. 
 
One problem with all of these sensors and detectors is that they tend to produce some 
false alarms, due to background radiation and other innocent emissions from 
legitimate cargo [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)].  
 
Nevertheless, a more widespread use of the detectors already available today would 
certainly improve the security of the container system and work as a deterrent. For the 
future, research is needed, including the use of test beds, to develop faster, more 
reliable and affordable detectors of WMD. 
 
 
Automated Targeting Technologies 
 
The Automated Targeting Technologies are rules-based analytical tools that uses 
cargo information, law enforcement information, and historical data, along with 
information from the intelligence community, to assess the risk posed by the cargo 
[Department of Homeland Security, 2005 (C2)].  
 
The availability of cargo information much earlier in the process created an 
environment in which the risk assessment of cargo takes place even before the cargo 
was loaded on vessels at foreign ports. This system supports the assessment of all 
types of maritime cargo and is not limited to containerized cargo [Lee-Whang, 2003 
(D4)]. 
 
Benefits of AT Technologies included paperless processing, elimination of repetitive 
trips to the local customs house, reduction of cargo dwell time, and increased customs 
compliance [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]. 
 
For example, the 24-hour rule of the Customs and Border Protection, require the 
shipping manifest information 24 hours before the container is loaded for destination 
in a harbor of the United States. 
 
The AT Technologies provides automatic 24-hour manifest status updates and 
generates manifest reports by container, voyage, bill of lading, date, unlading port, 
shipper/consignee, and more. Through a customs message-tracking interface, manifest 
status information is available via automatic email notifications [Dahlman-Mackby-
Alewine, 2005 (B9)].  
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Access Control and Biometrics
 
Access control is one layer of physical security implemented 
at transportation facilities to ensure that only authorized 
individuals gain access to 
2006 (D0)].  
 
Typically this involves some form of credential (ID badge) and 
electro-mechanical door and gate controls. 
 
                                                                                                  
 
However, such systems are vulnerable to lost or stolen ID cards. 
nowadays, it has been evaluated
control systems in realistic operational environments
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Image 10. Fingerprint biometric device
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pedro 
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secured areas [Hallowell-Jankowski, 
 
                             Image 9. Gate control
For this reason, 
 the integration of biometric devices
. 
                     Image 11. Ocular biometric device
Vizcaino Moreno 
 
 into access 
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4. Analysis of the Measures to improve the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In the following sections will be analyzed each of the Agreement and Technological 
Measures identified. 
 
To do this, in a first phase has been analyzed for each measure identified, which basic 
elements of the Security of the C.S.C. are affected. These basic elements have been 
identified in this project and have been denominated as the global elements "Tools". 
 
In a second phase has been analyzed for each measure identified, how it affects at the 
different elements of Performance of the C.S.C. These elements have been identified in 
this project and have been denominated as the global elements "Performance”. 
 
 
4.2. Analysis of the Measures VS global elements “Tools” 
 
4.2.1. Analysis summary tables 
 
Following, are the analysis summary tables of the Agreement and Technological 
measures regarding the global elements "Tools". 
 
These tables can be found in its original format in the Excel file named “ANNEX 3. 
Analysis of the Measures”. 
 
   
Agreement Measures 
  
 
MTSA C-TPAT CSI OSC PSI MI ISPS 
T
o
o
ls
 
1 Infrastructure and physical security X x x x x x X 
2 Documentation / Info security X     x       
3 Cooperation and coordination X x x x x x   
4 Policy, standards and regulations X           X 
5 Cargo Security X x x x 
 
  X 
6 Transit security X x x x    X 
Table 9. Analysis summary table “Agreement Measures VS Tools” 
 
In the analysis table Agreement Measures VS Tools, have been indicated the basic 
elements to which are addressed and affect each of the Agreement measures. Due to 
the wide range and dispersion of the proposals incorporated in these measures, have 
been determined two levels of involvement. 
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In this way, it has been marked with intense orange those elements that are affected 
directly and with greater intensity for each measure. And it has been marked with a 
less intense orange those elements that can potentially be improved by influence of 
measures but require further actions alien to the actions determined by the Measure 
of agreement. 
 
 
   
Technological Measures 
  
 
TM-1 TM-2 TM-3 TM-4 TM-5 TM-6 TM-7 
T
o
o
ls
 
1 
Infrastructure and physical 
security       x x   X 
2 Documentation / Info security     x     x   
3 Cooperation and coordination               
4 
Policy, standards and 
regulations               
5 Cargo Security x x x       X 
6 Transit security x x x x x   X 
Table 10. Analysis summary table “Technological Measures VS Tools” 
 
Technological Measures Code 
Antitamper Seals Technologies TM-1 
Sensor Technologies TM-2 
RFID Technologies TM-3 
Non-Intrusive Inspections TM-4 
WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies TM-5 
Automated Targeting Technologies TM-6 
Authentication Technologies TM-7 
 
 
In the analysis table Technological Measures VS Tools, are indicated similarly to which 
basic elements of the security of the C.S.C. are addressed and affect each 
Technological Measure. In this case, they are much more concrete measures that the 
Agreement measures. 
 
 
4.2.2. Analysis of the Agreement Measures 
 
In the next section will be analyzed in detail each of the Agreement measures 
regarding  the elements "Tools”, developing broadly the information synthesized in the 
Analysis summary tables. Thus, from the definition given for each “Tool” and of the 
information identified in the literature on each agreement measure, the results of the 
analysis are as follows: 
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Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) 
 
The requirements defined in the MTSA have provided a conceptual basis for the 
development of the most of the agreements and policies relating to the Security of the 
C.S.C. 
 
Thus, the MTSA mainly affects the supply chain tool called “Policy, standards and 
Regulations” as it has been the germ of many other initiatives. 
 
The MTSA is a broad agreement measure and its requirements will require execute 
actions by different stakeholders of the Supply Chain that will affect all the basic 
elements of the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
 
The C-TPAT is a voluntary program that recognizes that U.S. Customs can provide a 
high level of security only through close cooperation with the ultimate owners of the 
supply chain [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]. 
 
Thus, the C-TPAT influences and affects mainly on "Cooperation and Coordenation" as 
a way to improve the security of the C.S.C. 
 
The goal of Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is to push 
responsibility for cargo security onto stakeholders in the supply chain. 
 
For this, the C-TPAT offers to its members rewards, with potential benefits, at the 
importers who elevate their security measures and make their internal procedures 
more transparent. 
So, the Participants sign an agreement that commits them to conduct a 
comprehensive self-assessment of supply chain security using the C-TPAT guidelines 
[Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]. 
 
Through this self-assessment, the members using the C-TPAT guidelines (indicated in 
the point 3.2. Agreement Measures), can potentially improve and influence in many 
basic elements of security. So, not directly but through their members, the C-TPAT also 
affects in the “Infrastructure and Physical Security” and in the “Cargo” and “Transit 
Security”. 
 
 
Elements to evaluate the Security of the C.S.C. Pedro Vizcaino Moreno 
61 
 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
 
In the CSI, through bilateral agreements, Customs and Border Protection officers are 
stationed at foreign seaports where they work with the host government to identify 
high-risk shipments before they are shipped to the United States [Department of 
Homeland Security, 2005 (C2)].  
 
Thus, the CSI with their bilateral agreements, primarily promotes the “Cooperation 
and Coordination” between the U.S. and other nations in the world. 
 
And through its fundamental requirements (indicated in the point 3.2. Agreement 
Measures), the CSI has also a strong impact in the “Infrastructure and Physical 
Security” and in the “Cargo” and “Transit Security”. 
 
 
Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) 
 
The OSC is a collaborative effort between the federal government, business interests, 
and the maritime industry to develop and share best practices for the safe and 
expeditious movement of containerized cargo [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
 
Thus, the CSI mainly is intended to promote an atmosphere of “Cooperation and 
Coordination” between different stakeholders in the Security of the Supply Chain, 
developing these new technologies and best practices. 
 
As previously mentioned in the point 3.2. Agreement Measures, to can found a project, 
it must accomplish one or more of the following tasks to secure the supply chain 
[Haveman-Shatz, 2006 (C9)]: 
• Validate security at the point of origin, to include the security of the shipment 
itself and the information that describes it. 
• Secure the supply chain from the point of origin to its final destination and all 
the points in between. 
• Monitor the movement and integrity of the cargo while in transit using 
available technology. 
 
So, indirectly, through these projects of evaluation and develop of new technologies 
and best practices, can be improved many other basic elements with the integration of 
these new technologies and best practices in the Supply Chain system: “Infrastructure 
and Physical Security”, “Documentation / Info Security”, “Cargo Security” and 
“Transit Security”. 
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Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
 
The PSI also has an impact mainly on “Cooperation and Coordination” to improve the 
security of the C.S.C. This impact in the “Cooperation and Coordination” is done 
specifically through the develop of interdiction exercises between the members of 
the Initiative, to improve the identification and interception of transports suspected of 
carrying WMD-related materials before they reach the ports of the states members of 
the program. 
 
These actions of interception of Weapons of Mass Destruction before they reach at 
port and they cause a catastrophe in the port or inside of the nation, also affect 
favorably the improvement of the “Infrastructure and physical security”, adding this 
detection and interception as an additional physical tool of security and thereby 
protecting the infrastructure and other basic physical elements of the supply chain 
system. 
 
 
Megaports Initiative 
 
As the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Megaports Initiative also affects the 
“Cooperation and Coordination” between the United States and countries of origin of 
goods, identifying WMD and related materials but in this case in the ports of origin, 
increasing the screening capacity of such materials in these ports. 
 
These screening activities at the port of origin of Weapons of Mass Destruction, greatly 
improve the “Infrastructure and physical security” of the Supply Chain, improving the 
physical tools to detect and moving the danger of nuclear elements away from the 
port of arrival. 
 
 
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) 
 
Like the MTSA for the United States, the ISPS mark the conceptual basis for the 
development of most of the agreements and policies relating to Security of the C.S.C. 
at the international level and its requirements have been adopted as required by the 
members of the European Union. 
 
Thus, the ISPS affects mainly the tool of the Supply Chain named “Policy, standards 
and Regulations” as it provides a basis for action to other actions aimed towards the 
Security of the C.S.C. at international level. 
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Among the requirements in the ISPS, are proposed actions to be taken by various 
actors in the supply chain, which potentially can improve several key elements 
regarding the Security of the C.S.C.: “Infrastructure and physical security”, “Cargo 
Security” and “Transit Security”. 
 
These requirements have already been mentioned in the point 3.2. Agreement 
Measures, and are as follows: 
For ships the framework includes requirements for (ISPS Code): 
• Ship security plans 
• Ship security officers 
• Company security officers 
• Certain onboard equipment 
 
For port facilities, the requirements include (ISPS Code): 
• Port facility security plans 
• Port facility security officers 
• Certain security equipment 
 
In addition the requirements for ships and for port facilities include (ISPS Code): 
• Monitoring and controlling access 
• Monitoring the activities of people and cargo 
• Ensuring security communications are readily available 
 
 
4.2.3. Analysis of the Technological Measures 
 
In the next section will be analyzed in detail each of the Technological measures in 
relation to the global elements “Tools”. Thus, from the definition given for each “Tool” 
and the information identified in the literature about each Technological measure, the 
result of the analysis is as follows: 
 
 
Antitamper Seals Technologies 
 
This technology clearly affects the security of the Supply Chain, concretely of the 
containers, both in the procedures of loading the goods into containers and sealing, 
as in the procedures to ensure that the goods remain safe on the way towards their 
destination. 
 
Thus, the "Antitamper container seals" are aimed at improving the "Cargo Security" 
and the "Transit Security" in the Containerized Supply Chain, because the Antitamper 
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seals create an additional physical barrier in the containers, hindering that they are 
tampered or in case they are tampered in route can be identified clearly this 
manipulation. 
 
 
Sensor Technologies 
 
Although with greater accuracy and range of features, the Container Sensors also aim 
to optimize the containers security, both in their process of loading and sealing as in 
the transportation to the destination. 
 
Therefore, the Container Sensors are also aimed at improving the "Cargo Security" and 
the "Transit Security" in the C.S.C., facilitating the detection of dangerous and illegal 
components in the containers during their filling and also detecting possible 
manipulations of the content in the transport to the port of destination. 
 
 
Radio-Frequency Identification Technologies 
 
The Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the most promising technologies of 
future in the improving of the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
In addition, as discussed in later sections, it is also a technology that decisively 
influences in the performance and efficiency improvement of the Supply Chain. 
 
Thus, as already is mentioned in paragraph 3.3. Technological Measures of this project, 
the advantages of using RFID are substantial and regarding with the Security of the 
C.S.C., are focused mainly in track the handling of cargo while it is moving through 
the various steps of container shipping system. 
 
Thus, RFID technology is focused mainly on optimizing the security of cargo from it is 
deposited in a container, through all the way, until it arrives at destination. That is, it 
focuses on improving the “Cargo Security” and “Transit Security” of the Supply Chain, 
improving the track of the handling of cargo while it is moving through the various 
steps of container shipping system. This helps to prevent and detect tampering and 
misrouting of the cargo, and can also detect the location where they have occurred. 
 
 
In addition, the use of RFID allows managing information and documentation from the 
containers in a way more accurate and secure. Therefore, the RFID also influence with 
importance in the “Documentation and Info security”, recording and transmitting 
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accurate and secure information about a container’s origin, destination, contents, or 
processing history, and this information can be used to detect risks and breaks in the 
security of the Supply chain. 
 
 
Non-Intrusive Inspections technologies: X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Scanning 
 
The Non-Intrusive Inspections allow to visualize for inspections of a container’ 
contents, obviating the need to open it and inspect the contents physically.  
 
These technologies affect the improvement of the basic element “Infrastructure and 
physical security”, strengthening the physical tools to improve security at ports and 
nexus of the Supply Chain. 
 
Thus, these technologies improve the security of the physical facilities where it is 
developed an important part of the supply chain, allowing to inspect in a way more in 
depth and less invasive the containers arriving at the facilities, looking dangerous or 
prohibited components without opening the containers and more effectively than with 
conventional inspections. 
 
Furthermore, it can improve the “Transit Security”, since these technologies can be 
used to verify the integrity of the containers and the legality of the goods inside on a 
non-invasive way, while they are traveling through the supply chain system using the 
X-ray and Gamma-ray scanning portals. 
 
 
WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies  
 
The WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies allow detect weapons of mass 
destruction, their delivery systems and related material. 
 
Similar at the Non-Intrusive Inspections, these technologies allow detect in a non-
invasive and remote way, in that case the existence of radioactive elements in the 
supply chain. 
 
They can be installed fixed in ports or on the connecting links of the Supply Chain 
(portal sensors) or, consist in portable devices (radiation pagers). 
 
Thus, these technologies can improve the "Infrastructure and physical security" 
assisting the detection of radioactive elements in ports scanning the containers with 
Portal Sensors, or through mobile sensing elements they can influence the "Transit 
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Security", detecting possible radioactive elements inside containers being transported 
on vessels using the radiation pagers. 
 
 
Automated Targeting Technologies 
 
The AT Technologies are focused clearly on improving the security of the C.S.C., by 
optimizing the management of the information available regarding the transport of 
goods in container. 
 
This technology clearly influences in the improvement of the basic element 
“Documentation / Info Security” allowing to centralize digitally all the information 
available regarding the transport of goods in container (cargo information, historical 
data, law enforcement information),  and expediting secure transmission of it, to easily 
identify security risks along the supply chain. 
 
For example, for the 24-hour rule, the AT Technologies provide automatic 24-hour 
manifest status updates and generate manifest reports by container, voyage, bill of 
lading, date, unlading port, shipper/consignee, and more. Through a customs message-
tracking interface, manifest status information is available via automatic email 
notifications [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]. 
 
 
Authentication Technologies: Access Control and Biometrics 
 
The Authentication Technologies are one layer of physical security implemented at 
transportation facilities to ensure that only authorized individuals gain access to 
secured areas [Hallowell-Jankowski, 2006 (D0)].  
 
Thus, these technologies increase the security of the infrastructure and facilities that 
are part of the system of the containerized supply chain, to limiting and controlling the 
access of people to sensitive areas of these facilities, using credentials and 
electromechanical doors and gate controls or, biometrics devices. Therefore, this 
technology is aimed at improving the "Infrastructure and physical security" of the 
Supply Chain. 
 
Moreover, by limiting access to only authorized persons, is also increased the security 
in cargo loading procedures in the containers ("Cargo Security"), reducing the 
possibility that someone outside of the charging procedure can access to the cargo 
area and manipulate the contents of the containers.  
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Also is increased the security in the process of transporting these containers to their 
destination ("Transit Security), reducing the possibility that someone outside can 
access to the area of the containers while they are being transported to their 
destination. 
 
 
4.2.4. Conclusions of the Analysis of the Measures VS “Tools” 
 
After analyze in detail each agreement and technological measure in relation with the 
elements "Tools", has carried out a review of the analysis summary tables, in order to 
extract conclusions about: 
• To which elements called "Tools" these measures are directed mainly? 
• What elements are less covered? 
• What measures cover a larger number of elements? 
• … 
 
   
Agreement Measures 
  
 
MTSA C-TPAT CSI OSC PSI MI ISPS 
T
o
o
ls
 
1 Infrastructure and physical security X x x x x x x 
2 Documentation / Info security X     x       
3 Cooperation and coordination X x x x x x   
4 Policy, standards and regulations X           X 
5 Cargo Security X x x x 
 
  X 
6 Transit security X x x x    X 
Table 11. Analysis summary table “Agreement Measures VS Tools” 
 
 
Thus, reviewing the table of Agreement measures VS Tools can be extracted various 
conclusions: 
• The most worked element for the Agreement measures is clearly the 
“Cooperation and Coordination” between the different stakeholders in the 
supply Chain. 
• The basic element less covered by the Agreement measures is “Documentation 
and Info Security”. Any Agreement initiative deals with the importance that it 
deserves the security of this element of the Supply Chain that is becoming 
increasingly basic in the functioning of this Supply Chain, with a growing 
dependency on the information. 
• Highlights the MTSA by the extent of its proposed actions touching with more 
or less significance all the basic elements related to the security of CSC. The 
MTSA is the germ of all the other initiatives about this topic emerged in the 
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United States. For this reason has been highlighted “Policy, standards and 
regulations”, as the element that it affects with more importance. 
• The ISPS is the germ of initiatives in relation to the Security of the C.S.C. at 
international level, as well as the MTSA is at the U.S. level. For this reason also 
emphasizes the "Policy, standards and regulations ". 
• Highlights the CSI, like an initiative which is aimed strongly at improving many 
basic elements of the CSC Security. The CSI consists in agreements between 
different parties to develop research programs of new technologies for 
improving the CSC Security. So, it increases strongly the “Cooperation”, but also 
other basic elements of the CSC Security, by the new technologies developed. 
 
   
Technological Measures 
  
 
TM-1 TM-2 TM-3 TM-4 TM-5 TM-6 TM-7 
T
o
o
ls
 
1 
Infrastructure and physical 
security       x x   x 
2 Documentation / Info security     x     x   
3 Cooperation and coordination               
4 
Policy, standards and 
regulations               
5 Cargo Security x x x       x 
6 Transit security x x x x x   x 
Table 12. Analysis summary table “Technological Measures VS Tools” 
 
Technological Measures Code 
Antitamper Seals Technologies TM-1 
Sensor Technologies TM-2 
RFID Technologies TM-3 
Non-Intrusive Inspections TM-4 
WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies TM-5 
Automated Targeting Technologies TM-6 
Authentication Technologies TM-7 
 
 
Reviewing the table of Technological Measures VS Tools can be also extracted various 
conclusions: 
• The basic elements to which are more widely addressed the technological 
measures are the "Transit Security", followed by the "Cargo Security ". That is 
because most of the technological measures are focused only in the containers, 
on their security in the filling and sealing, and their security in the transport to 
the port of destination. 
• The elements less covered by the technical measures are "Cooperation and 
Coordination" and “Policy, standards and Regulations”. There are no 
technological measures to improve these basic elements. In fact this is logical, 
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because these two elements by their nature and definition should be improved 
by the Agreement measures. 
• Highlight the RFID and the Authentication Technologies, such as the measures 
that positively affect at a greater number of basic elements. 
• Finally, the Automated Targeting Technologies is the technological measure 
identified that covers a smaller number of elements, affecting only to improve 
the “Documentation and Info Security”. However, this technological measure is 
important, because the element “Documentation and Info Security” is the one 
unless covered by both the Agreement measures such as by the technological 
measures. 
 
 
4.3. Analysis of the Measures VS global elements “Performance” 
 
4.3.1. Analysis summary tables 
 
Following, are displayed the analysis summary tables of the agreement and 
technological measures regarding the global elements “Performance”. 
 
These tables can be found in its original format in the Excel file named “ANNEX 3. 
Analysis of the Measures”. 
 
   
Agreement Measures 
  
 
MTSA C-TPAT CSI OSC PSI MI ISPS 
P
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 1 Efficiency - + = - - - - 
2 Reliability + + + + = = + 
3 Shipment Transparency + + + + + + = 
4 Fault tolerance + = = = = = + 
5 Resilience + = = = = = + 
Table 13. Analysis summary table “Agreement Measures VS Performance” 
 
 
 
   
Technological Measures 
  
 
TM-1 TM-2 TM-3 TM-4 TM-5 TM-6 TM-7 
P
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 1 Efficiency - - + - - + - 
2 Reliability + + + = = = + 
3 Shipment Transparency = + + + + + = 
4 Fault tolerance = = + = = = = 
5 Resilience = = + = = = = 
Table 14. Analysis summary table “Technological Measures VS Performance” 
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Technological Measures Code 
Antitamper Seals Technologies TM-1 
Sensor Technologies TM-2 
RFID Technologies TM-3 
Non-Intrusive Inspections TM-4 
WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies TM-5 
Automated Targeting Technologies TM-6 
Authentication Technologies TM-7 
 
Both for the Agreement Measures, and for the Technological Measures, the analysis 
process followed regarding the Performance elements has been the same: For each 
element of Performance has been identified if they are increased (+), reduced (-) or 
not affected (=) for each Measure. 
 
 
4.3.2. Analysis of the Agreement Measures 
 
In the next section will be analyzed in detail each of the agreement measures 
regarding the global elements "Performance". Thus, from the definition given for each 
“Performance” and the information identified in the literature about each measure of 
agreement, the results of the analysis are as follows: 
 
 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) 
 
None of MTSA’s requirements clearly help improve the “Efficiency” of the supply 
chain. In fact, the shipping industry has expressed some concern that its measures will 
increase shipping costs [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)].  
This is because the implementation of these requirements involves a possible financial 
effort required to purchase machinery and a possible increase in the processing time 
of containers, by increasing the number of security procedures (inspections, 
paperwork, more complex and stringent business practices. 
 
However, the proposals outlined by the MTSA, in terms of creating security plans at 
different levels of the supply chain, encourage the retrieving and delivering of goods as 
directed, with a minimum amount of loss due to shrinkage, tampering, terrorist attack 
or accident [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. Thus, the MTSA positively fortifies the “Reliability” 
of the Supply Chain, through its proposed security plans. 
 
Among the actions proposed by the MTSA also highlight those to improve the tracking 
of containers and control of personnel who have access for these containers, and 
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other similar actions. The execution of these proposed actions also influences in the 
improvement of the "Shipment Transparency" of the Supply Chain, helping to make a 
better tracking of containers, helping with its requirements to ensure a greater control 
over what there is in the containers. 
 
In addition, through the execution of the proposed Response and Disaster Plans and 
Rapid-response security teams, the MTSA also can significantly improve the “Fault 
Tolerance” and the “Resilience” of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
 
The C-TPAT can clearly increase the “Efficiency” of the Supply Chain, because its 
shippers and carriers members are rewarded through quicker processing and reduced 
probability of inspection delays [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
 
Also through its guidelines (indicated in the point 3.2. Agreement Measures), the C-
TPAT requires its members to do a self-assessment of the supply chain security, 
improving aspects that enhance the “Reliability” and the “Transparency” of the Supply 
Chain. 
 
Finally the C-TPAT doesn’t propose actions to decrease the effects of system hardening 
or mitigate the consequences of failures or attacks. Thus, this measure doesn’t have 
effect in the “Fault Tolerance” and in the “Resilience” of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
 
This program could reduce the processing time required at domestic ports of entry. 
However, because the program could increase processing time at the port of origin, it 
is not clear that a net improvement of efficiency will result [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
Therefore, the CSI doesn’t affect the “Efficiency”, and actually moves the inspection of 
containers to the ports of origin, instead of conducting inspections at ports of 
destination. 
 
But the CSI proposes actions (view point 3.2. agreement Measures) to increase and 
improve the screening at the port of origin and to ensure and verify that the containers 
are kept secure during transit. The execution of these and other similar actions 
proposed have a clear impact on improving the “Reliability” and the “Shipment 
Transparency” of the Supply Chain. 
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In addition, the CSI is mainly focused on increased detection capabilities and it doesn’t 
help to decrease the effects of system hardening or mitigate the consequences of 
failures or attacks [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. So, the CSI doesn’t affect in the “Fault 
Tolerance” and in the “Resilience” of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) 
 
Strictly speaking, the OSC Measure reduces the “Efficiency” of the supply chain, 
because the investment required for the evaluation and testing of new scanning, 
antitampering, screening and tracking of containers technologies. In addition, the 
inclusion of these technologies in the Supply Chain system adds processing time of the 
goods in the Supply Chain. 
 
However, the evaluation, testing and inclusion of these new technologies and business 
practices in the Supply Chain system, increase the “Reliability” and the “Shipment 
transparency” of the Supply Chain. 
 
The OSC does not reduce or modify the consequences of terrorist attacks or smuggling 
incidents if they are successful. Neither it provides for compensation or mitigation to 
lessen the impact of losses from fraud, terrorism, or theft [Haveman-Shatz, 2006 (C9)]. 
Thus, the OSC does not affect the improvement of the “Fault Tolerance” and the 
“Resilience” of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
 
Clearly, all actions for the detection and intersection of radioactive materials that may 
form part of a weapon of mass destruction create costs and losses of time in the 
System, reducing the “Efficiency” of the Supply Chain. 
 
In addition, the PSI doesn’t look to improve the retrieving and delivering of goods as 
directed, with a minimum amount of loss due to theft and accident (“Reliability”), 
because actually  just seeks to optimize the detection and intersection of high risk 
containers containing radioactive materials. 
 
Therefore, it seeks to improve the “Shipment Transparency” of the Supply Chain, 
making that the goods that flow through a supply chain are legitimately represented to 
authorities and are legal for transport. The PSI improves the “Shipment Transparency”, 
detecting and intercepting containers with nuclear elements, thereby achieving an 
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overall improvement of the legality of goods in the Supply Chain System and a greater 
control and visibility of the contents of containers. 
 
 
Megaports Initiative 
 
The Megaports Initiative also requires increased cost for purchasing and installing 
radiation detection equipment at origin ports. In addition, it generates an increase of 
time due to the inspection of containers with the new sensors. All this leads to a 
reduction of the “Efficiency”. 
 
Just like in the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Megaports Initiative not affects the 
“Reliability” of the Supply Chain. But it improves the “Shipment Transparency”, 
through a more complete scan of the containers, helping to check the legality of the 
content of containers through deeper and less invasive inspections. So, this helps to 
optimize the control of the content of containers. 
 
This initiative doesn’t provide actions to improve the “Fault tolerance” and the 
“Resilience” of the supply chain. 
 
 
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) 
 
The ISPS requires the creation of conduct vulnerability assessments in the seaports 
and in the seagoing vessels and develop and submit for approval security plans for 
the ports, in addition of the installation of an automatic identification systems on 
board [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 2005 (B9)]. All this leads to economic efforts and 
increases in processing times for goods. Thus, there is a reduction of the “Efficiency” 
of the Supply Chain. 
 
On the other band, through the execution of the requirements proposed by the ISPS 
(view point 3.2. Agreement Measures), contributes to reduce the potential loss of 
goods due to shrinkage, accident or terrorist attack, thereby improving the 
“Reliability” and allow for better control and monitoring of containers throughout in 
the supply chain, improving the “Shipment Transparency” of the Supply Chain. 
 
The ISPS does not propose actions to improve the “Fault Tolerance” and the 
“Resilience” of the Supply Chain. 
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4.3.3. Analysis of the Technological Measures 
 
In the next section will be analyzed in detail each of the technological measures 
regarding the global elements “Performance”. Thus, from the definition given for each 
“Performance” element and the information identified in the literature about each 
Agreement measure, the results of the analysis are as follows: 
 
 
Antitamper Seals Technologies 
 
The Antitamper Container Seals entail additional costs in the supply chain system and 
an increase in the processing time of containers in the system, to install and uninstall 
these technological pieces in the containers. Therefore, they decrease the “Efficiency” 
of the C.S.C. 
 
But the Antitamper Container Seals, being a broad set of technologies that detect and 
indicate when an unauthorized party has opened a container, help to reduce the loss 
from theft or tampering of the goods, thus improving the “Reliability” of the Supply 
Chain. 
 
This type of technology does not affect the “Shipment Transparency”, because it 
doesn’t allows control of the content of the goods throughout the trip. The 
“Antitamper seals” only prevent that the containers are opened, or by clearly indicate 
if this event has occurred. So do not help to control, verify and make more visible the 
goods contained in the containers to see if they are legal and correct, according to the 
official specifications of contents of the container. 
 
This type of technology neither affect in any way in the improvement of the “Fault 
Tolerance” and the “Resilience” of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
Sensor Technologies 
 
Just like the Container Seals, the Container Sensors also present a financial effort for 
the participants in the supply chain and an increase in processing times of containers, 
because of the cost and time required to install and uninstall these technologies in the 
containers. That causes a decrease in the “Efficiency”. 
 
However, it improves the “Reliability” of the supply chain, because these sensors help 
to combat shrinkage and terrorist acts. They also help to exercise better control over 
the content of the container, detecting the dangerous and illegal elements and 
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producing real-time alerts, thus improving the “Shipment Transparency” of the Supply 
Chain. 
 
This technology doesn’t affect the improvement of the “Fault Tolerance” and the 
“Resilience” of the Supply Chain. 
 
 
Radio-Frequency Identification Technologies 
 
The RFID technology is expressly intended to increase “Efficiency” in the Supply Chain 
[Hallowell-Jankowski, 2006 (D0)]. 
 
RFID technology is intended to make the supply chain “Transparent” and “Reliable”, 
allowing carriers and shippers to track shipments from origin to destination. Through 
that tracking, shippers might see where bottlenecks occur in their supply chain and 
could potentially optimize shipping to improve supply chain efficiency [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 
(B6)].  
 
With RFID the Supply Chain is more “Transparent” because it improves the tracking of 
containers and can easily and accurately determines where are the goods at any time, 
identifying possible deviations and tampering. 
Likewise, the RFID can increase the “Reliability” of the Supply Chain, as it allows a 
greater control over the goods by tracking, preventing theft and tampering. 
 
“Transparency” resulting of the tracking can reduce the costs of theft and lost goods 
through early detection of misrouted or unapproved goods, improving the “Efficiency” 
 
Although RFID is not expected to modify the  effects of a successful terrorist attack or 
disaster, the ability to locate and reroute shipments rapidly following disasters 
improves supply-chain “Fault Tolerance” and “Resilience” [Willis-Ortiz, 2004 (B6)]. 
 
 
Non-Intrusive Inspections Technologies: X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Scanning 
 
The installation of machines to make Non-Intrusive Inspections container scanning is 
not expected to improve supply-chain “Efficiency”. In fact, scanning adds time to the 
processing of containers, and in addition the port operators or customs inspectors 
must bear the costs of the scanning equipment.  
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On the contrary, it helps to improve the “Shipment Transparency” of the supply chain, 
promoting a better and less intrusive control of the contents of containers at the port 
and along the trip and, detecting possible anomalies in the content. 
 
However, the limitation of action of these technologies only to the scanning, means 
that they are not useful in improving the “Fault tolerance” and the “Resilience” in the 
supply chain. 
 
 
WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies 
 
The status of WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies in relation to the elements of the 
Supply Chain Performance is very similar to that of X-Ray and Gamma Ray Scanning. 
They decrease the “Efficiency” in the supply chain because of the cost of the 
equipment and adding container processing time, caused by the installation and 
operation of these detection technologies in the Supply Chain System. 
 
Similarly, they help to improve the “Transparency” in the supply chain, favoring a 
better control of the contents of containers, through the detection of radioactive 
elements. 
 
As in the X-Ray and Gamma Ray scanning, the limitation of actions of these 
technologies to the scanning causes that they are not useful in improving the “Fault 
tolerance” and the “Resilience” in the supply chain. 
 
 
Automated Targeting Technologies 
 
The Automated Targeting increases the “Efficiency” of the Supply Chain, automating 
and computerizing the assessment of the risk posed by the cargo and with the 
availability of the cargo information much earlier in the process. So, the AT 
Technologies include paperless processing, elimination of repetitive trips to the local 
customs house, reduction of cargo dwell time, and increased customs compliance. This 
reduces costs and increases the Efficiency in the Supply Chain [Dahlman-Mackby-Alewine, 
2005 (B9)]. 
 
The AT Technologies clearly increase the “Transparency” in the supply chain, because 
these technologies are based on maximizing the risk assessment of the cargo, 
centralizing and scanning all the cargo information and making this information about 
the containers more accessible and more flexible. 
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This technology is not applicable in the increasing of the “Fault Tolerance” and the 
“Resilience” of the supply chain. 
 
 
Authentication Technologies 
 
These technologies reduce the “Efficiency” of the supply chain, because of the 
economic effort that involves the inclusion of these technologies in the supply chain 
system and due to the increase of time and logistical barriers generated to the 
implementation of the access and biometrics controls. 
 
However, the existence of a greater personnel control that has access to sensitive 
areas such as loading areas or warehouses increases the “Reliability” of the Supply 
Chain. 
 
This technology isn’t applicable to improve the “Shipment Transparency”, or the 
“Fault tolerance”, or the “Resilience” of the supply chain. 
 
 
4.3.4. Conclusions of the Analysis of the Measures VS “Performance” 
 
After analyze in detail each agreement and technological measure in relation with the 
elements of “Performance”, has carried out a review of the analysis summary tables, in 
order to extract conclusions about: 
• To which elements called "Performance" these measures are directed mainly? 
• What elements are less covered? 
• What measures cover a larger number of elements? 
• … 
 
   
Agreement Measures 
  
 
MTSA C-TPAT CSI OSC PSI MI ISPS 
P
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 1 Efficiency - + = - - - - 
2 Reliability + + + + = = + 
3 Shipment Transparency + + + + + + = 
4 Fault tolerance + = = = = = + 
5 Resilience + = = = = = + 
Table 15. Analysis summary table “Agreement Measures VS Performance” 
 
Thus, reviewing the table Agreement measures VS Performance can be extracted 
various conclusions: 
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• The element most covered by the Agreement measures is the “Shipment 
Transparency”. 
• A large number of Agreement measures affect in a negative mode in the 
"Efficiency" of the supply chain, because of the financial efforts and increases in 
processing times of the containers that represent the implementation of the 
proposed actions. 
• Only the C-TPAT, to reward with reductions in inspections of its members, may 
increase the “Efficiency” of the supply Chain. 
• The elements unless worked on the proposed actions by the Agreement 
measures are the “Fault Tolerance” and the “Resilience”. 
• The measures that have a worse impact in the Performance elements are the 
PSI and the Megaports Initiative, increasing only the "Shipment Transparency", 
but decreasing the "Efficiency ", because of the costs of acquiring and installing 
the radiation detection equipment and because of the increases of time by 
increasing inspections with this radiation detection equipment. 
 
 
   
Technological Measures 
  
 
TM-1 TM-2 TM-3 TM-4 TM-5 TM-6 TM-7 
P
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 1 Efficiency - - + - - + - 
2 Reliability + + + = = = + 
3 Shipment Transparency = + + + + + = 
4 Fault tolerance = = + = = = = 
5 Resilience = = + = = = = 
Table 16. Analysis summary table “Technological Measures VS Performance” 
 
Technological Measures Code 
Antitamper Seals Technologies TM-1 
Sensor Technologies TM-2 
RFID Technologies TM-3 
Non-Intrusive Inspections TM-4 
WMD Remote Monitoring Technologies TM-5 
Automated Targeting Technologies TM-6 
Authentication Technologies TM-7 
 
 
Reviewing the table of Technological Measures VS Performance, can be also extracted 
various conclusions: 
• The most covered Performance element by the technological measures is the 
“Shipment Transparency” 
• The elements unless worked on the proposed actions by the Technological 
measures are the "Fault Tolerance" and the “Resilience” 
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• The Performance element with a worst impact by technological measures is the 
“Efficiency” by the costs of the implantation of the technologies and the 
increases in processing time resulting from the operation of these technologies 
in the Supply Chain system. 
• Only the RFID technology and the Automated Targeting Technologies can 
potentially improve the “Efficiency”, compensating the costs of 
implementation, with a significant improvement in supply chain management, 
logistics and computationally, reducing processing times and costs of cargo 
handling . 
• Highlights the RFID technology as the only of the analyzed technologies that 
can potentially improve all the elements of Performance in the Supply Chain, 
cutting processing times and costs of container management, that compensate 
the costs of technology implementation. 
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5. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The following section is intended to capture all the conclusions that can be extracted 
result of the development of this project. 
 
So, will be exposed the most relevant conclusions that can be extracted from the 
different basic phases of this project: 
• In the process of searching for the literature used as a basis of study and 
analysis in this project. 
• In the process of the analysis of the documents, collecting and linking the 
identified elements that allow to define and to assess the Security of the C.S.C.  
• In the process of collection and analysis of the proposed and implemented 
Measures to improve the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
 
Additionally, in this section of the project is intended to propose a set of 
recommendations of action addressed to specialized authors and to the stakeholders 
directly involved in the topic of the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
 
5.1. About the generation of the Research Database 
 
Can be extracted several relevant conclusions as a result of the process of generation 
of the Research Database of literature related to the C.S.C. and its security. 
 
The first important aspect is that there has been an explosion of creation of literature 
related to this topic since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
 
Moreover, the way that it is treated the issue of the Security of the C.S.C. in the 
literature has changed radically from a literature that gave emphasis on managing the 
security to prevent the smuggling and shrinkage (the loss of cargo shipments through 
theft and misrouting) to a literature that emphasizes in preventing terrorists from 
targeting the C.S.C. or transporting a weapon in a shipping container. 
 
Another striking aspect is the great asymmetry in the origin of the literature: almost all 
the literature written about the topic of the Security of the C.S.C. comes from authors 
or institutions of United States origin. 
 
This implies that most of this literature is focused on the specific problem of the 
United States, that is, how the U.S. deals with the topic of the Security of the C.S.C. 
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Carefully analyzed, it seems logical this greater effort in this area by the United States, 
because this country has potentially a greater risk of being targeted by illegal acts that 
could affect the normal operation and security of the C.S.C. 
 
In the search of relevant literature, also can be concluded that there is a rich body of 
literature that talks about the current situation of the C.S.C., the changes occurred 
since September 11 and about the agreement and technological measures proposed 
and implemented to improve the its security, but there is a major weakness in the 
study and proposal of elements that allow to define the Security of the C.S.C. and 
assess this security. 
 
Moreover, many authors that propose elements and methods to assess the C.S.C., in 
reality they are focused on evaluating the performance and responsiveness of the 
C.S.C. to disruptions caused by the normal operation of the Supply Chain in the market 
economy (political and economic changes, changes in offer and demand, actions of the 
competitors), without focusing on the elements that define the security against actions 
outside the normal operation of the Supply Chain (theft, terrorism, ...). 
 
However, have been identified several authors which propose elements that allow to 
define and to assess the Security of the C.S.C. and, through the identification, 
collection and study of these elements, in this project has intended fill slightly this 
existent gap in the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
 
5.2. About the collecting and linking of the identified elements 
 
In the process of analysis of the literature, have been directly identified 30 elements 
that allow to define and to assess the Security of the C.S.C. at different levels and from 
different points of view. 
 
However, from the analysis of the definitions given by the authors for each of these 
elements, it can be observed that although with sometimes quite different 
denominations and with definitions a little different, many of the elements proposed 
by the authors have big and obvious points in common. 
 
So, it can be concluded that there are some basic and recurrent elements in the 
literature (which in this project have been referred as Global Elements) that define the 
security and performance of the C.S.C. 
 
Thus, conceptually linking the identified elements, they have been grouped into 14 
Global Elements and that define the Security and Performance of the C.S.C. 
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Moreover, measuring how frequently are used each of these Global Elements in the 
literature (view Table 6. Global Elements VS Authors) can be concluded that highlights 
the global element “Infrastructure and physical security” as the most proposed in the 
literature analyzed to define the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
And it can also be concluded that in this literature are also especially relevant the 
global elements “Documentation and Info Security”, “Cooperation and Coordination” 
and “Policy, Standards and Regulations”. 
 
Additionally, going deeper into the definition of the elements integrated into each of 
the Global Elements (view point 2.4.2. Original elements integrate in each global 
element), it has been generated a conceptual definition for each Global Element. 
 
From the process of generation of conceptual definition of the Global Elements, it can 
be concluded that exists a clear difference of nature between those Global Elements. 
 
So, can be identified 3 major subgroups in which can be classified the 14 Global 
Elements: 
• In this way, have been identified a group of Global Elements relating to all 
those basic elements, tools and procedures that define the Security of the 
C.S.C. This group of Global Elements, in this project, has been named as Tools. 
• Another group of Global Elements relating to the possible problems that may 
affect in a negative way in the operation of the C.S.C. This group of Global 
Elements has been named as Vulnerabilities. 
• And finally, another group of Global Elements relating to all elements that 
define the performance of the C.S.C. This group of elements has been named 
as Performance. 
 
 
In the development of this phase of the project, highlights the poor quantity of 
literature suggesting elements to define and assess the Security of the C.S.C. This 
project aims to fill this gap by collecting and analyzing the various elements proposed 
by different authors identified. 
 
Also highlights the absence in the specialized literature of proposed models to assess 
precisely and numerically the different aspects that influence in the Security of the 
C.S.C. 
 
In contrast, there are many proposals of mathematical models of all types (some of 
them nothing intuitive) that allow to evaluate from the point of view of the 
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management, the efficiency and responsiveness of the Supply Chain to disruptions 
caused by the normal operation of the Supply Chain in the market economy (political 
and economic changes, changes in offer and demand, actions by competitors). 
 
 
5.3. About the collection and analysis of the Measures 
 
In the process of collection and analysis of the proposed and implemented measures 
to improve the security of the C.S.C., highlights the existence of a rich literature that 
talks about this topic. 
 
Thus, through this rich literature are exposed a large number of proposals to improve 
the security of the C.S.C. and they can be clearly divided between agreement measures 
and technological measures. 
 
However, as already indicated in previous sections, highlights the fact that most of 
efforts and literature addressed to the topic of the Security of the C.S.C. have their 
origin in the United States. 
 
Thus, following the collection of measures, it can be concluded that most of these 
measures are proposed by the United States and most of its profits fall in the United 
States, too. 
 
That conclusion is more evident among the Agreement Measures. So, of the 7 
agreement measures identified, only one has been proposed by an international entity 
and to a international level (ISPS) and the other measures have their origin in the 
United States and affect only them, or consist of bilateral agreements between the 
U.S. and other countries, focusing the most of the security benefits in the United 
States. 
 
After analyze in detail each agreement and technological measure in relation with the 
elements of “Performance” and the elements “Tools”, it has carried out a review of the 
analysis summary tables, in order to extract conclusions about: 
• To which elements these measures are directed mainly? 
• What elements are less covered? 
• What measures cover a larger number of elements? 
• … 
 
These specific conclusions can be consulted in the sections 4.2.4 and 4.3.4 of this 
project, for the analysis of the measures respect to the groups of elements “Tools” and 
“Performance”, respectively. 
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From the analysis of the agreement and technological measures respect to the groups 
of elements “Tools” and “Performance” (view tables 11 and 12 to the Agreement 
measures and tables 15 and 16 to the Technological Measures), can be extracted some 
general and relevant conclusions, which are exposed following. 
 
With respect to the group of elements “Tools”, the Agreement Measures are mainly 
focused on improving the element “Cooperation and Coordination”, while the 
Technological Measures are mainly focused on the “Cargo Security” and the “Transit 
Security”.  
 
From this it can be concluded that the agreement measures have focused on 
promoting the cooperation between the different stakeholders in the Security of the 
C.S.C., while the technological measures have focused on improving the security of the 
containers in the loading processes (cargo security) and in the transport of these to 
their destination (transit security). 
 
 
Large number of measures both agreement and technological, impact in a negative 
way on the efficiency of the C.S.C., in most of cases by increasing the cost and time of 
processing of the goods, by implementing new procedures and security machinery. 
 
Only the C-TPAT, the RFID Technology and the Automated Targeting Technologies are 
able to offset the costs of implementation, with reductions in the costs and time of 
processing of the goods. 
 
In fact, the RFID technology highlights as the only measure that is able to improve all 
the elements of “Performance” of the C.S.C. and also impact in a relevant way on 
several of the basic elements “Tools”. Unfortunately for its still high cost of 
implementation, the use of RFID is limited to the valuable cargo, but when the use is 
extended and the cost is reduced, this technology is destined to be strongly used. 
 
Still focused on the elements of Performance highlight the “Fault Tolerance” and the 
“Resilience”, because from the analysis can be concluded that they are the 
Performance elements less covered by the agreement measures and by the 
technological measures. 
 
In fact only the agreement measures MTSA and ISPS (through the execution of the 
proposed Response and Disaster Plans and the Rapid-response security teams) and the 
RFID Technology (through the ability to locate and reroute shipments rapidly following 
disasters) can to improve the “Fault Tolerance” and the “Resilience” of the C.S.C. 
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Finally it can be concluded from the analysis that the “Shipment Transparency” is the 
best covered Performance element by both the agreement and technological 
measures. 
 
 
5.4. Recommendations 
 
The literature on the topic of Security of the C.S.C. must leave the national level 
(mainly focused on the U.S.) and move to the international level. 
 
The Containerized Supply Chain is a global system and therefore the issue of its 
security is also global. So the studies and proposals should not be unilateral or bilateral 
(as is currently with the United States), and this topic must be addressed on an 
international level. 
 
This requires the implementation of actions to promote the international 
diversification of the literature about the Security of the C.S.C., ending with the large 
asymmetry existent in the origin of the literature. 
 
Continuing with the specialized literature, must be increased the effort of study to go 
deeper into the definition of elements to define the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
And going even further, additional efforts must be concentrated on the generation of 
models to define and assess precisely and if it is possible numerically the basic 
elements of the Security of the C.S.C. 
 
Turning to the topic of the measures proposed and implemented to improve the 
security of the C.S.C., it is also required international diversification of the proposed 
measures. 
 
As with the specialized literature, the proposed measures (mainly the agreement 
measures) must pass from the national level (focused primarily on the United States) 
to the international level. 
 
Already there are efforts in that direction, as the creation of the International Ship and 
Port Security (ISPS) initiative, but looking at the vast disparity of proposals in favor of 
the United States, it is clear that is required a much greater effort. 
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It should make efforts to optimize the costs of implementation and operation of both 
agreement and technological measures, so they do not adversely affect the efficiency 
of the C.S.C. 
 
In this respect special efforts should be made in the development of RFID technology 
because it is a technology with enormous potential in improving the performance of 
the C.S.C., but not yet used in large scale because its development is not fully 
completed and now its use is limited to high-value goods. 
 
It has been identified a clear gap in the measures to improve the “Fault Tolerance” and 
the “"Resilience” of the C.S.C. It is therefore recommended that governments and 
international bodies should make use of the necessary mechanisms to promote the 
development of technologies and agreement measures to improve these important 
characteristic elements of the C.S.C. 
 
Similarly, with the aim of improving the “Fault Tolerance” and “Resilience” should be 
optimized the already existing measures that improve these elements: the MTSA, the 
ISPS and the RFID. 
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6. Annexes 
 
Attached to this document are available the auxiliary documents created and/or used 
as a support in the elaboration of this project. 
 
These documents consist primarily of Excel files created and used as auxiliary tools to: 
• Collect the literature identified and that have been the basis for the analysis in 
the project. 
• Collect, link and classify the elements identified in the literature. 
• Analyze the agreement and technological measures identified to improve the 
Security of the C.S.C. 
 
 
And they also consist in the collection of the full documents in PDF format of the 
literature identified and analyzed in this project to obtain the objectives of the project. 
 
 
6.1. Annex 1: Research Database (Excel) 
 
Attached at the present document, there is available the Excel file ANNEX 1: Research 
Database, where have been collected and coded the basic literature that have been 
found, studied and analyzed in this project, in relation with the Security of the C.S.C. 
and its assessment. 
 
In the point 2.2. Research Database of the present project is detailed the process 
followed for the search, identification, collection and encoding of these documents in 
the Excel file. 
 
 
So, in the Excel file, have been identified each document with an alphanumeric code: 
Letter+Number. 
 
For each document have been also indicated the Research Topics used to find them in 
the database "ISI Web of Knowledge" 
• For example, the following code: 01 (8) indicates that have been found the 
document using the Research topic RS-01 in the ISI database and the 
document is in position 8 of the results list. 
• The documents that are coded as follows: 05 (8.1) are documents that have 
not found directly in ISI but have been found elsewhere through a document 
from the ISI database. 
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In the Excel file, below the main table, are listed the documents that are considered 
interesting but couldn't be found the full document. 
 
For each document that has been available, have been also mentioned the website 
where have been found the full document. 
 
According to the potential information that can be extracted from each of the 
documents, they have been rated with a level of utility. And moreover, has been 
updated periodically the Excel file, marking progressively the elements already read 
and analyzed. 
 
In the Excel file, are marked in green, the documents that have been considered 
important in the development of the study of the documents and in the development 
of this project. And are marked in orange, the documents that are considered essential 
in the development of the study of the documents and in the development of this 
project. 
 
Also, there are indicated and encoded the Research Topics inserted in the database ISI 
Web of Knowledge and SCOPUS to find the necessary basic literature for this project. 
 
 
6.2. Annex 2: Elements (Collecting-Linking-Classification) (Excel) 
 
Attached to this document is also available the Excel file ANNEX 2. Elements 
(Collecting-Linking-Classification). 
 
This Excel file has been used to made the collection and the linking of the elements 
related with the Security and Performance of the C.S.C. that allow to define and to 
assess this Security (identified in some of the documents that compose the Research 
database), generating the Global Elements. Have also been analyzed and classified 
these Global elements. 
 
In the points “2.3. Collecting the elements” and “2.4. Linking the elements: Defining the 
Global elements” is indicated in detail the process followed with the support of the 
Excel file ANNEX 2: Elements (Colleting-Linking-Classification) to collect, analyze, link 
and classify the elements, obtaining and classifying which that in this project have 
been named as Global Elements. 
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6.3. Annex 3: Analysis of the Measures (Excel) 
 
The Excel file “ANNEX 3. Analysis of the Measures” has been used to support the 
analysis of the Agreement and Technological measures to improve the Security of the 
C.S.C. versus the global elements Tools and Performance. 
 
In this Excel file there are the Analysis summary tables in the original format. Thus, in 
the tab named “Measures VS Tools”, is where there are the analysis tables of each of 
the agreement and technological measures respect to the global elements "Tools", and 
in the tab named “Measures VS Performance”, is where there are the analysis tables of 
each of the agreement and technological measures respect to the global elements 
"Performance". 
 
In the points 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 are explained in detail the parameters followed to 
implement the results of the analysis in the summary tables, for the elements named 
Tools and Performance, respectively. And in the points 4.2.4 and 4.3.4 have been 
extracted conclusions by the analysis of the summary tables, for the elements named 
Tools and Performance, respectively. 
 
 
6.4. Annex 4: Documents of the Research Database (pdf’s) 
 
Attached to this document is also available the ANNEX 4: Documents of the Research 
Database 
 
In the ANNEX 4: Documents of the Research Database there are the full pdf’s files of 
the basic literature that compose the Research Database of this project. 
 
This literature is the one that has been analyzed to perform the search, collection and 
the linkage of the objective elements of this project and to identify, collect and analyze 
the Agreement and Technological measures to improve the Security of the C.S.C. 
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